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EXECUTION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS BY THE
UNITED STATES VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
David Weissbrodt*
INTRODUCTION
On March 27, 1987, for the first time in its twenty-seven year his-
tory, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (Commission)
found the United States in violation of international human rights law.'
The Commission is both a consultative organ of the Organization of
American States (OAS), and the principal international human rights
institution in the Western Hemisphere. The Commission is charged
with promoting the observance and protection of human rights in mem-
ber states. 2 To carry out its mandate, the Commission examines com-
munications alleging human rights violations of member states.3 When
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author wishes to express his grati-
tude to Teresa O'Toole and Ruth Gaube - both of the University of Minnesota Law
School, class of 1989 - for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/I.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987);
see Cerna & Young, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the
Death Penalty, 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 398, 399-400 (1987) (describing the Inter-
American Commission and the Roach case); Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR), Washington: Application of Death Penalty on Juveniles in the US.!
Violation of Human Rights Obligation Within the Inter-American System, 8 HUll.
RTs. L.J. 345 (1987) (including commentary by Dinah Shelton).
2. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. !(1), re-
printed in HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.65, doc. 6 (1985) [hereinafter Com-
mission Statute]. The Commission derives its authority from the Charter of the Organ-
ization of American States (OAS) and the American Convention on Human Rights.
Charter of the OAS, Apr. 30, 1948, arts. 51, 112, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361,
119 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No.
6847, 721 U.N.T.S. 324; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts.
33-51, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, OEA/ser. L./V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 2 [hereinafter
American Convention].
3. Commission Statute, supra note 2, art. 20. As a prerequisite for the Commission
to admit a communication, all domestic remedies must have been invoked and ex-
hausted. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, approved
Apr. 8, 1980, amended Mar. 7, 1985, art. 37, reprinted in HANDBOOK OF EXISTING
RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 117, OEA/
ser. L./V/II.65, doc. 6 (1985) [hereinafter Regulations of the Commission].
The Commission monitors those human rights obligations contained in the American
Convention, supra note 2, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, May 2, 1948, by the Ninth International Conference of American States, Bo-
gota, Colombia, reprinted in HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN
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the Commission finds a violation, it makes recommendations for im-
proving the observance of human rights obligations to the government
concerned.
The Commission considered petitions brought on behalf of two young
offenders sentenced to death for crimes committed while under the age
of eighteen and decided that the United States violated international
law by permitting the executions. The petitioners asked the Commis-
sion to decide whether the failure of the United States to prevent these
executions violated the right to life and the prohibition of cruel, infa-
mous, and unusual punishments guaranteed by the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man.5 Two United States lawyers filed
a petition with the Commission on behalf of James Terry Roach8 after
the United States Supreme Court refused three times to hear Roach's
appeal for review of his death sentence.1 Amnesty International also
filed a petition in the case, alleging that international law forbids the
execution of offenders for crimes committed while under the age of
eighteen.'
RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 19, OEA/ser. L./V/1l.60, doc. 28 rev. 1
(1983) [hereinafter American Declaration]. Commission Statute, supra note 2, art.
t(2). The United States is not a party to the American Convention, see infra note 40
(noting that the United States has not ratified the convention); therefore, the Commis-
sion based its decision in Case 9647 on United States violations of the American Decla-
ration. Case 9647, paras. 44-49, INTER-AM C.H.R. 147, 164-66, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
4. Commission Statute, supra note 2, art. 20. In addition to examining individual
communications alleging human rights violations, the Commission provides consultative
services to OAS members regarding their human rights obligations, submits an annual
report of its activities to the OAS General Assembly, and conducts on-site observations
with the consent of member states. Id. art. 18.
5. American Declaration, supra note 3, arts. I, XXVI. Petitioners also relied on
article VII of the American Declaration, which provides that protection will be spe-
cially afforded to children. Id. art. VII.
6. The lawyers filing the petition were Mary McClymont, a member of the Wash-
ington, D.C. Bar, and the present writer. The American Civil Liberties Union and the
International Human Rights Law Group co-sponsored the initial complaint. Case 9647,
para. 2, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 148, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The
lawyers chose to present the Roach case to the Commission because Roach's original
lawyers, after exhausting all remedies under United States law, requested that the pre-
sent author and his colleague Mary McClymont, petition the Commission on behalf of
Roach. In addition, it is important to note that Roach, a mentally-retarded juvenile
who was accompanied in the crime by a mentally-competent adult, constituted a more
sympathetic defendant than the average juvenile sentenced to death. See infra notes
21-33 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural history of the Roach Case).
7. Roach v. Martin, 474, U.S. 865, reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1014 (1985), stay de-
nied sub nom. Roach v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 1039 (1986). The impending execution of the
second petitioner, Jay Pinkerton, for a murder he committed at age 17, was registered
with the Commission on May 8, 1986. Case 9647, para. 7, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147,
149, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
8. Case 9647, para. 2, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 148, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9
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The petitioners drew international attention to the Roach case0 and
sought to influence the legislatures, courts, and executives of those
twenty-five states in the United States that still impose the death sen-
tence for offenses committed by persons under eighteen.10 The ensuing
publicity over the Roach case echoed as far as the United States Su-
preme Court." After refusing for years to consider the validity of death
sentences for juvenile offenders,12 the United States Supreme Court
granted a petition for certiorari in Thompson v. Oklahoma on Febru-
ary 23, 1987.13 In that case, the Supreme Court will determine whether
a sentence of death for a crime committed by a juvenile constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution.1 4
rev. 1 (1987).
9. Eighteen international human rights and legal organizations indicated to the
Commission their support of the complaint against the United States. Case 9647, para.
2, INTER-Ahi. C.H.R. 147, 148, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The peti-
tioners requested the assistance of the Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary
Executions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. This request brought
increased attention to Roach's predicament. See Weissbrodt, The Three "Theme" Spe-
cial Rapporteurs of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 80 Ai. J. INTL'L L. 685,
691 (1986) (noting that the Special Rapporteur issued a public appeal for Roach's life
prior to Roach's execution in January, 1986).
10. Brief of Petitioner at 45, Case 9647, INTER-Abs. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). Death penalty statutes in 25 of the 36 states that retain
capital punishment set the minimum age for its application at less than 18, or set no
age minimum at all. V. Streib, Minimum Statutory Ages for the Death Penalty (Apr.
1987) (unpublished memorandum). This memorandum and others referred to infra are
updates of the data compiled in an earlier article by Professor Victor L. Streib, Cleve-
land-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University. See Streib, Death Penalty
for Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Commit-
ted Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613 (1983) (listing earlier versions of the
statistics).
11. See McCarthy, Executing Very Young Children, Wash. Post, Dec. 28, 1985, §
A, at 17, col. 2. (discussing, in general, the execution of juvenile offenders in the
United States and, in particular, Roach's impending execution and his appeal to the
Commission). Roach's execution was also the subject of Nightline (ABC television
broadcast, Jan. 9, 1986).
12. Until it granted the petition for certiorari in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 107 S.
Ct. 1284 (1987), vacated, 56 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1988) the Supreme Court
had declined to resolve the issue of imposition of death sentences for juvenile offenders.
Pinkerton v. McCotter, 474 U.S. 865, reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 990 (1985), cert. denied,
reh'g denied, stay denied, 476 U.S. 1109 (1986); see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104 (1982) (declining to reach the issue of execution of juvenile offenders and subse-
quently deciding the case on other grounds).
13. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987), vacated, 56 U.S.L.W. 4892
(U.S. Jun. 29, 1988).
14. See Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), vacated
sub nom. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 56 U.S.L.W. 7892 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1988) (outlining
appellant's argument that, because Thompson was only 15 at the time he committed
the murder, imposition of the death penalty would violate the eighth amendment prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishment).
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The grant of certiorari in the Thompson case completely changed
the political posture of the Roach case as it stood before the Commis-
sion. Individual jurisdictions in the United States, now awaiting the de-
cision of the Supreme Court on the juvenile execution issue, had little
reason to be influenced by the findings of the Commission in Roach.
Nevertheless, the change in the attitude of the Supreme Court gave the
Commission an excellent opportunity to influence the outcome of the
[Ed. Note: Since this Article was written, the Supreme Court has rendered a deci-
sion in Thompson. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988). In Thompson, a
plurality of four justices - Stevens, Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun - held that
execution of juveniles who were under 16 years of age at the time of their offense
violated the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in the eighth amendment
to the United States Constitution. Id. at 2700. In reaching this decision, the plurality
relied on (1) state statues which denied juveniles under 16 various privileges and re-
sponsibilities granted to adults, (2) a minimum age of 16 in those states statutes which
set such a minimum age for the death penalty, (3) international consensus against exe-
cuting juveniles, and (4) the infrequent application of the death penalty in the United
States. On the basis of this evidence the plurality concluded that United States society
holds juveniles under age 16 to different standards than adults - at least with regard
to the death penalty. Id. at 2692-98. The plurality also noted that the execution of
juveniles would not aid the social purposes of retribution and deterrence underlying
imposition of the death penalty because juveniles are considered less culpable than
adults and because states so infrequently apply the death penalty to juveniles. Id. at
2699-700.
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the plurality's con-
clusion that a societal consensus exists which forbids application of the death penalty to
juveniles under age 16 at the time of their offense. Id. at 2709-10. In questioning the
existence of such a societal consensus, she pointed to the presence of both state and
federal statutes that allow the execution of juveniles under 16 at the time of their
offense. Id. at 2708. Rather than presume a consensus in such uncertain circumstances,
Justice O'Connor preferred to leave the determination of a minimum age for the death
penalty to the individual legislatures. Id. at 2709. Nevertheless, she noted that the
Oklahoma statute in question and others like it specified no minimum age, producing a
risk that the legislatures passing such statutes either failed to realize they could apply
to juveniles or failed to give the question of juvenile execution the special care and
deliberation the Court has required of decisions leading to the death penalty. Id. at
2710-11. In view of this ambiguity and the evidence of consensus as to a minimum age
for the death penalty, Justice O'Connor concluded that juveniles under the age of 16 at
the time of their offense cannot be executed under statutes which do not specify a
minimum age for the death penalty. Id. at 2711. Justice Scalia wrote the dissent for
himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice White. Justice Scalia questioned whether
there existed a national consensus against executing juveniles under the age of 16 and
criticized the use of international standards for interpreting the eighth amendment. Id.
at 2711, 2716 n.4. Justice Kennedy did not take part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
Shortly after deciding Thompson, the Court granted certiorari in two more juvenile
death penalty cases. The defendant in one of these cases, Wilkins v. Missouri, was 16
years old at the time of his offense. Wilkins v. Missouri, 736 F.2d 409, 415 (Mo. 1987),
cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3026 (U.S. July 19, 1988) (No. 87-6026). The defendant in
the other case, High v. Zant, was 17 years old at the time of his offense. High v. Zant,
819 F.2d 988, 993 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3026 (U.S. July 19,
1988) (No. 87-5666).]
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Thompson case. The Commission could have decided that executing
juveniles is cruel, infamous, or unusual punishment, and as such consti-
tutes a violation of the guarantee to the right to life of the American
Declaration. 15 Such a decision would have strengthened the argument
that the execution of juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the United States Constitution. Unfortunately, the Com-
mission's opinion promulgated in the Roach case suffers from flawed
reasoning and incorrect applications of international law. Thus, the
opinion is unlikely to provide meaningful guidance for the Supreme
Court. Read least favorably, the opinion may be interpreted as stating
that a federal system of criminal justice violates international law. A
more generous interpretation of the opinion is that, in light of the guar-
antee of the American Declaration to the right to life, and the peremp-
tory international norm forbidding the execution of children, it would
be an arbitrary deprivation of life and inequality before the law to per-
mit the execution of juveniles to depend on the location of the offense."6
The Commission thus based its decision on a perceived flaw in the fed-
eral criminal justice system of the United States,1 7 and thereby squan-
dered its opportunity to influence the Supreme Court. Consequently,
the Roach opinion will provide only limited aid to the now approxi-
mately thirty young United States citizens sentenced to death for of-
fenses committed before they reached eighteen.' 8 In addition, the
Roach decision is unlikely to influence the development of an interna-
tional human rights norm against the execution of juvenile offenders.
The Commission missed its opportunity to help change United States
law and to develop international law partly because its analysis went
15. American Declaration, supra note 3, arts. I, XXVI.
16. Case 9647, paras. 63-65, INTER-Ahi. C.H.R. 147, 173, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987); American Declaration, supra note 3, arts. I, I1.
17. Case 9647, para. 63, INTER-ArMs. C.H.R. 147, 173, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc.
9 rev. 1 (1987).
For the federal Government of the United States to leave the issue of the appli-
cation of the death penalty to juveniles to the discretion of State officials results
in a patchwork scheme of legislation which makes the severity of the punishment
dependent, not primarily, on the nature of the crime committed, but on the loca-
tion, where it was committed.
Id.
18. See V. Streib, Persons on Death Row as of May 1, 1987, for Crimes Commit-
ted While Under Age Eighteen (Nov. 1987) (unpublished memorandum).
Amnesty International's amicus curiae brief in Thompson supports the conclusion
that the decision in Roach will be of limited aid to other United States citizens sen-
tenced to death for crimes committed before they reached 18 because the brief men-
tions the Roach decision only in a footnote. Brief for Amicus Curiae Amnesty Interna-
tional in Support of Petitioner at 32 n.22, Thompson v. State, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987),
vacated sub nom. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 56 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1988)
(No. 87-5666).
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far beyond the arguments of the parties to the case and raised issues
that were not adequately considered. Whether the execution of Roach
violated the non-discrimination provision (Article II) of the American
Declaration was an issue that was neither briefed nor argued by the
parties.19 The Commission nevertheless gave this issue considerable
weight in the promulgation of its opinion. The Commission also based
its decision in part on an issue related to the transfer of juvenile offend-
ers for trial as adults, which was not presented in the facts before it. 2 0
This article outlines the arguments of the petitioner in Roach, and
the response of the State Department for the United States. It then
analyzes the bases for the decision of the Commission and explores the
international human rights issues raised by imposition of the death pen-
alty on juveniles. Finally, it proposes an approach for the Commission
to use in the future to improve its decision-making process and to avoid
unfortunate decisions such as the one issued in Roach.
I. HISTORY OF CASE 9647
Petitioner James Terry Roach was charged with being involved with
an adult and another youth in the rape and murder of a fourteen-year-
old girl, and the murder and armed robbery of her seventeen-year-old
boyfriend. 21 The other youth turned state's evidence and received a sen-
tence of life imprisonment. The dominant adult pleaded guilty, and led
Roach to'plead guilty as well. Although he was chronologically seven-
teen at the time of his trial, Roach's mental age was only twelve be-
cause he was mentally retarded.2 2 Nevertheless, the trial court sen-
tenced him to death on December 16, 1977.
19. Brief of Petitioner at 39-43, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./
V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The complaint against the United States alleged viola-
tions of the guarantee to the right to life of the American Declaration (Article I), its
guarantee of special protection for children (Article VII), and its prohibition of cruel,
infamous, and unusual punishments (Article XXVI). Id. at 34.
20. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-390, 400 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (stating that any
child, 17 years of age or older, alleged to have violated the law prior to reaching the
age of 17 shall be treated as a child and all others shall be treated as adults); TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, §§ 3, 5 (Vernon 1971) (limiting juvenile court
jurisdiction to those under seventeen). The issue of discretionary transfer of juveniles
for trial in adult criminal courts was not relevant in either Roach's or Pinkerton's case;
neither petitioner could have been tried in juvenile court, because each was 17 years
old at the time of his offense. Case 9647, para. 57, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 171, OEA/
ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The Commission, nevertheless, focused its discus-
sion on the transfer of juveniles to be tried as adults. Id.
21. Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1468 (4th Cir. 1985).
22. Case 9647, para. 23, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev.
1 (1987).
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After the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld this sentence,23 the
United States Supreme Court denied Roach's first petition for certio-
rari.24 Upon denial of certiorari, Roach applied for, and was denied,
post-conviction relief in the South Carolina trial court. The South Car-
olina Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of this denial.2 5 The United
States Supreme Court again refused to review the decisions of the
South Carolina courts.26 Subsequently, Roach petitioned the United
States District Court of South Carolina for a writ of habeas corpus, but
the petition was denied.27 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the district court,28 and Roach
unsuccessfully sought certiorari from the United States Supreme Court
for the third time.29 Having exhausted his domestic remedies, Roach's
attorneys brought his case before the Commission."
The Commission, pending its review of Roach's petition, sought to
preserve the status quo and requested a stay of execution from United
States Secretary of State George Shultz and South Carolina Governor
Richard Riley. 31 International dignitaries, including the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations, also sought relief for Roach.32 Despite these
pleas for clemency, Roach was executed on January 10, 1986.33 The
Commission, in a vote of five members to one, held that the United
States violated the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man through its executions of Roach and a second juvenile offender,
23. State v. Shaw (and Roach), 273 S.C. 194, 194, 255 S.E.2d 799, 799 (1979).
24. Roach v. State, 444 U.S. 1026, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1104 (1980).
25. Roach v. State, Mem. Op. No. 81-MO-197 (S.C. July 17, 1981).
26. Roach v. South Carolina, 455 U.S. 927 (1982).
27. Roach v. Martin, Civil Action No. 81-1907-14 (May 11, 1984).
28. Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463 (4th Cir. 1985).
29. Roach v. Martin, 474 U.S. 865, reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1014 (1985), stay de-
nied sub nom. Roach v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 1039 (1986).
30. See Regulations of the Commission, supra note 3, art. 37 (articulating that
petitioners must exhaust their domestic remedies before bringing cases to the
Commission).
31. See id. art. 29 (authorizing provisional relief in execution cases). The State
Department, in response to the request of the Commission, claimed that no domestic
legal ground allowed federal executive intervention in the implementation of Roach's
sentence by South Carolina. Case 9647, para. 3, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 149, OEA/
ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). Governor Riley stated that he would not inter-
vene. See Espy, Executioner Prepares to Kill a Man For a Juvenile Crime, Minneapo-
lis Star & Tribune, Jan. 9, 1986 (discussing the Roach case, and the history of juvenile
execution in the United States).
32. Brief of Petitioner at 6, Case 9647, INTER-Am1. C.H.R., 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
33. Case 9647, para. 3, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev.
1 (1987). The requests from the Commission to Secretary of State Shultz and to Texas
Governor Mark White for a stay of petitioner Pinkerton's execution were similarly un-
availing. Id. at para. 7. Pinkerton was put to death on May 15, 1986. Id. at para. 4.
1988]
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Pinkerton. 4 The Commission member from the United States did not
participate in the discussion or decision of the Roach case?
II. ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER
Petitioners in Case 9647 first asked the Commission to reaffirm its
previous holding that the American Declaration is binding on the
United States.3 They sought a declaration that the executions of
Roach and Pinkerton for offenses committed while under the age of
eighteen violated the American Declaration as interpreted in light of
customary international law.3 7 Petitioners asserted that the Commis-
sion should use international human rights treaties and the practice of
almost all of the nations in the world to inform the American Declara-
tion's provisions. Petitioners asked the Commission to confirm the exis-
tence of a rule of customary international law prohibiting the execution
of juveniles.38
34. Id. at paras. 63-65.
35. See Regulations of the Commission, supra note 3, art. 19(2)(a) (providing that
a Commission member need not participate in decisions of cases brought against his or
her own state). The United States requested that the Commission reconsider the case.
Request for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 3/87, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R.
147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The Commission denied the request
on 21 September 1987, stating:
In the opinion of the Commission its decision does not undermine the structures
of U.S. federalism, however, federalism cannot be used as a shield to prevent
compliance with a State's international obligations. The decision of the Commis-
sion does not require that the U.S. nationalize its criminal code, rather it guaran-
tees the protection of the most fundamental right -the right to life. The Com-
mission finds that the failure of the federal government to preempt the states in
this area has resulted in the arbitrary deprivation of the right to life given the
widespread disparity in sentences which have been handed down for the same
crimes. Consequently, the non-discrimination principle of the right to equality
clause (Article II) of the American Declaration, in the Commission's opinion,
does compel a uniformity in sentencing within the nation State when deprivation
of the right to life is involved.
The Reasons of the Commission for not Modifying its Decision, Case 9647, INTER-AM.
C.H.R., slip. op. at 1 (Sept. 21, 1987).
36. See Case 2141, para. 16, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 25, 33, OEA/ser. L./V/II.54, doc.
9 rev. 1 (1981), reprinted in 2 HuM. RTs. L.J. 110, 112 (1981) (stating that OAS
human rights instruments, including the American Declaration, are binding on the
United States).
37. Brief of Petitioner at 45-46, Case 9647, INTER-AM C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./
V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The American Declaration acquired binding force on
OAS member states through articles 3(j), 16, 51(e), 112 and 150 of the OAS Charter.
Case 2141, para. 16, INTER-AM. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L./V/II.52, doc. 48 (1981). Nu-
merous international treaties, resolutions, and declarations reflect the international con-
sensus against juvenile execution. See N. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 186 (1987) (arguing in favor of a consensus against juve-
nile execution).
38. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
[VOL. 3:339
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The complaint against the United States alleged that the execution
of persons for crimes committed before they reached eighteen violated
the guarantee of the American Declaration to the right to life, the pro-
vision affording special protection for children, and the prohibition of
cruel, infamous, or unusual punishments. 39 Petitioners claimed that the
ordinary meaning of the terms of the relevant articles, in their context
and in light of their object and purpose, required the United States to
prevent the execution of persons for crimes committed while under the
age of eighteen.
40
Petitioners asked the Commission to use customary international law
in interpreting the American Declaration. Customary international law
qualifies as a principal source of interpretation, under the interpretive
norms of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, because it
falls within the "relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties."41 Widespread state practice can reveal a
customary norm of international law where opinio juris also exists. Evi-
dence that the norm has been accepted as giving rise to an interna-
tional legal obligation constitutes opinio juris.42 Petitioners noted that
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1984).
39. See American Declaration, supra note 3, arts. I, VII, and XXVI (guaranteeing
the right to life, providing special protection for children, and prohibiting cruel, infa-
mous, or unusual punishment).
40. Brief of Petitioner at 14-20, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./
V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The American Declaration itself does not address the
issue of capital punishment. Case 9647, para. 44, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 164, OEA/
ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The OAS American Convention on Human
Rights specifically forbids states that are parties to the Convention to impose capital
punishment on persons under the age of 18. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 4,
para. 5. The United States has not ratified this agreement, however; thus the Commis-
sion could not find the United States in violation of it. Case 9647, para. 47, INTER-Am.
C.H.R. 147, 165, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1987); Case 2141, para. 31,
INTER-AM. C.H.R. 25, 43, OEA/ser. L./V/II.54, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1981); see also Ameri-
can Convention, supra note 2, art. 4, para. 5 (prohibiting imposition of the death pen-
alty on persons who were under 18 years of age when they committed the crime). But
see infra notes 82-83, and accompanying text (outlining the arguments of the United
States Department of State against reliance upon the American Declaration arts. I,
VII, and XXVI).
41. See M. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATF.ES 268
(1985) (pointing out that the Vienna Conference did not reject the use of customary
international law for interpretation under Vienna Convention, art. 31, para. 3(3)).
42. See Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BaT. Y.B. INV'L
L. 1, 31-35, 53 (1974) (explaining that the creation of customary rules requires opinio
juris); see Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International
Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655, 671
(1983) (stating that opinio juris distinguishes practices that a state considers binding
legal obligations from practices that the state may discontinue without breaching inter-
national law).
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treaties comprise a part of state practice,43 and cited three major inter-
national human rights treaties that explicitly prohibit imposing the
death penalty on persons under eighteen." Although the United States
has ratified only the Geneva Convention, it has signed the other two
treaties. 45 These treaties have been broadly accepted throughout the
world. 46 The greater the number of parties to a treaty, the greater the
inference that it rises to the level of customary international law.47 Ad-
ditionally, these treaties allow no derogation from their prohibitions
against imposing the death penalty on juveniles.' 8 Petitioners alleged
43. Brief of Petitioner at 22, Case 9647, INTER. AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (citing Akehurst, supra note 42, at 53).
44. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 4, para. 5 (forbidding states to
impose the death penalty on persons under 18 years old). International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, para. 5, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, Annex to
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 53, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], re-
printed in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (prohibiting the death sentence for anyone under 18
years of age); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3560, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 330 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] (prohibiting the death pen-
alty for protected persons under the age of 18 at the time of the offense).
45. Brief of Petitioner at 26, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). Petitioners noted that the Commission previously had used
the American Convention to interpret the American Declaration with respect to gov-
ernments that had not yet ratified the Convention. Id. at 30 (citing INTER-AM. C.H.R.,
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE: FINDINGS OF "ON-THE-SPOT"
OBSERVATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE 2-4, JULY 22-AUGUST 2, 1984, OEA/ser.
L./V/II.34, doc. 21 1 (1974)).
46. Nineteen American States have ratified the American Convention and three
others have signed it. INTER-AM. C.H.R., HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING
TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/ser. L./V/II.65, doc. 6
rev. 63 (1985). Eighty-six nations have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and nine others have signed it. MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED
WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE U.N., U.N. Doc. ST/LEG./SER. E.3 124
(1985), updated through June 30, 1986, in RESERVATIONS, DECLARATIONS, NOTIFICA-
TIONS, AND OBJECTIONS RELATING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS AND THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL THERETO, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/2/
Rev. 1, at 6-8 (1987), updated through March 1987 in Brief for Amicus Curiae Am-
nesty International in Support of Petitioner at 28, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 724 P.2d
780 (Okla. Crim. App.), vacated, 56 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1988). One hun-
dred sixty-five nations have ratified the Geneva Convention as of December 31, 1986.
States Parties to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, 1987 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 111.
47. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.) (W. Ger. v. Neth.)
1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Judgment of Feb. 20) (stating that very widespread and representa-
tive participation in a convention might suffice to show a general rule of international
law).
48. See American Convention, supra note 2, art. 27, para. 2 (allowing no deroga-
tion from the prohibition on the death penalty for persons under 18 years of age);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 44, art. 4, para. 2
(prohibiting derogation from the article 6, paragraph 5 prohibition on the imposition of
the death penalty on persons under 18 years of age).
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that these treaty provisions actually represented codifications of an al-
ready existing binding norm, citing the travaux pr~paratoires of the
documents.49
Petitioners offered national laws abolishing the death penalty as fur-
ther evidence of a customary norm prohibiting juvenile executions. 0
Thirty-two nations have completely abolished the death penalty. Eigh-
teen others apply it only for exceptional crimes, such as crimes commit-
ted under military law or during wartime.51 Forty-one of the countries
that retain the death penalty have statutory provisions exempting
juveniles from its application.52 In practice, the execution of persons for
crimes committed while under the age of eighteen is extremely rare. 3
Petitioners also noted that seven jurisdictions within the United States
set eighteen as the minimum age for application of the death penalty,
while another twelve consider age as a mitigating factor in sentenc-
ing." Additionally, both the American Bar Association and the Ameri-
can Law Institute oppose execution of persons for crimes committed
under the age of eighteen.55
49. Brief of Petitioner at 27, Case 9647, Il'rER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). Petitioners also cited a United Nations General Assembly
resolution which recognized that article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights constitutes a "minimum standard" for all Member States, not just
ratifying states. Id. at 28; see Hartman, supra note 42, at 672 n.64 (arguing that arti-
cle 6 was the codification of an existing and binding norm); see also G.A. Res. 35/172,
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 195, U.N. Doe. A/35/48 (1980) (urging member
states to respect as a minimum standard article 6 of the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights). Brief of Petitioner at 32-35, Case 9647, IN'ER-AM. C.H.R.
147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
50. Brief of Petitioner at 32-35, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA ser. L./
V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
51. Amnesty International, The Death Penalty, List of Abolitionist and Retention-
ist Countries, A.I. Index ACT 5/14/1985 (August 1987) [hereinafter Amnesty
International].
52. Hartman, supra note 42, at 666 n.44.
53. Brief of Petitioner at 34, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). "Amnesty International has collected data showing that,
since 1979, although 80 nations of the world have executed over 11,000 persons, only
six persons who committed offenses under 18 were executed by only four nations, in-
cluding the United States." Id.
54. Id. at 33 n.67 (citing V. Streib, Minimum Statutory Ages for the Death Pen-
alty (Oct. 1, 1985) (unpublished memorandum)). See Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets
the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 526-27 (1987) (discussing juveniles and the death
penalty).
55. Brief of Petitioner at 33, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(l)(d) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962) (excluding the death sentence for persons under 18 years of age at the
time of the crime); MODEL PENAL CODE 133 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980) (noting that the death penalty will never apply to a juvenile who committed
murder); AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION REPORT No. I17A (approved August, 1983)
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Petitioners concluded that approximately two-thirds of the nations of
the world reject the execution of juveniles. 56 Many nations have done
so either through ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, or the American Convention, or both. Many na-
tions have abolished the death penalty totally, allow it for exceptional
crimes only, or exempt juveniles from the death penalty.57 Petitioners
asked the Commission to find that the prohibition against juvenile ex-
ecutions had acquired the status of customary law, which the Commis-
sion should use to interpret and inform the American Declaration.58
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties calls for the petition-
ers' suggested method of interpretation. Article 31(1) provides: "A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose."59 In addition, article 31(3)(c) re-
quires consideration of any relevant rules of international law applica-
ble to the parties.60
Although the United States has not yet ratified the Vienna Conven-
tion, the State Department noted in its Letter of Submittal to the Pres-
ident that "the [Vienna] Convention is already generally recognized as
the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice."6 " Addition-
ally, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights previously used the
Vienna Convention as its sole guide for construing the American Con-
vention on Human Rights. Petitioners noted that article 18(a) of the
Vienna Convention requires states to refrain from acts that would de-
(opposing the death penalty for minors).
56. Brief of Petitioner at 35, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
57. Id. at 35-36.
58. Id. at 9; see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31(3), 31(3)(c),
opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
679, 691-92 (1969), entered into force Jan. 27, 1980 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]
(stating that a treaty must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to terms of the treaty in their context, in light of the object and
purpose of the treaty, and that any relevant rules of international law applicable to the
parties should be taken into account).
59. In re Viviana Gallardo, INTER-AM. C.H.R., Op. G 101/81 (1981), para. 20,
reprinted in Annual Report of the INTER-AM. C.H.R. 12, OEA/ser. P/AG/doc. 1510/
82 (1982) (holding that the American Convention must be read in accordance with the
principles of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention, article 31(1), which states
that provisions of a treaty must be read in accordance with their ordinary meaning in
their context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose).
60. Vienna Convention, supra note 58, art. 31, para. 3(c).
61. S. Exec. Doc. L, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971); see RESTATEMENT (REVISED)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Part III introductory note
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (stating that the State Department and United States courts
recognize the Vienna Convention as authority).
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feat the object and purpose of a treaty during the period between sign-
ing and ratifying the treaty. 2 Petitioners argued that this provision of
the Vienna Convention precluded the United States from allowing the
execution of persons for offenses committed while under eighteen. The
United States has signed but not ratified both the American Conven-
tion and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.03
Petitioners also cited the Vienna Convention in support of their argu-
ment that the Commission should not rely on the travaux pr~paratoires
of the American Declaration in interpreting its right-to-life provision,
as the United States had urged." Petitioners noted that article 32 of
the Vienna Convention provides for consultation of an agreement's
travaux prparatoires only after exploring the means of interpretation
under article 31. Article 32 then allows use of travaux prkparatoires
only to confirm the meaning revealed by the article 31 interpretation,
or to determine the meaning of the text if the article 31 interpretation
leaves the meaning ambiguous, obscure, or leads to a manifestly absurd
or unreasonable result.6 5 Petitioners asserted that the Commission
could not resort to this supplemental means of interpretation. They
contended that the primary means of interpretation under article 31,
including the use of customary international law, made the language in
the American Declaration clear. 6 The petitioners noted that consulta-
tion of the travaux does not clarify the meaning of the Declaration, but
permits differing interpretations of the Declaration's stand on capital
punishment.67
In response to the assertion of the United States that the federal
government had no power to delay South Carolina's execution of
62. Brief of Petitioner at 26 n.50, Case 9647, INTER-Ar.i. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.
L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
63. By signing the American Convention, the United States accepts the responsibil-
ity to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the objects of the treaty. Vienna Conven-
tion, supra note 58, art. 18, (requiring a state to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty when ... it has signed the treaty or... expressed its
consent to be bound by the treaty ....").
64. Brief of Petitioner at 36, Case 9647, INTER-Abs. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). But see infra notes 73-74, 82-86 and accompanying text
(outlining the arguments of the United States in favor of use of the travaux
prparatoires to interpret the right-to-life provision).
65. Brief of Petitioner at 36, Case 9647, IN'ER-ArI. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987); see Vienna Convention, supra note 58, art. 32 (stating that
supplementary means of interpretation, including travaux pr'paratoires, may confirm
the meaning resulting from primary interpretation under article 31, or may determine
the meaning when the interpretation under article 31 leaves the meaning obscure or
ambiguous or leads to a manifestly absurd result).
66. Brief of Petitioner at 38, Case 9647, INTER-AMs. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
67. Id. at 41.
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Roach,68 petitioners suggested that any appeal from a federal official
would have helped persuade the governor of South Carolina to issue a
reprieve pending the decision of the Commission.69 Petitioners added
that if the Commission interpreted the American Declaration to forbid
the execution of persons for juvenile offenses its interpretation would be
especially persuasive to state courts, federal courts, and state govern-
ment officials; an interpretation of an agreement of the United States
by an international body authorized to interpret it is binding on the
United States and its courts and agencies.7 1
III. RESPONSE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR THE
UNITED STATES
The United States denied the existence of a prohibition against juve-
nile executions, both within the American Declaration and as a norm of
customary international law.7 1 The United States, questioning whether
the Declaration had binding force, also disputed the applicability of the
Vienna Convention to interpret the American Declaration." The
United States argued that, even if the Vienna Convention did apply to
the American Declaration, the travaux prtparatoires of the Declara-
tion showed that its drafters failed *to agree on any limitation on the
use of the death penalty.73 Similarly, the United States argued that,
even if customary international law prohibited juvenile executions, the
United States had dissented from such a norm, and therefore was not
bound by it.74
The United States claimed that the silence of the American Declara-
tion on the issue of the death penalty constituted a deliberate choice on
the part of the drafters. The Commission therefore could not interpret
the Declaration to prohibit juvenile executions. 5 The United States al-
68. See supra note 31 (noting the claim of the State Department that the Execu-
tive lacked legal authority to intervene in the implementation of Roach's sentences).
69. Brief of Petitioner at 45, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
70. Id; see RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 325 reporter's note 5 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (citing Matter of
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 17 F.C.C. 450, 461 (1953)
for the proposition that an interpretation of an agreement of the United States by an
international body authorized by the agreement to interpret it is binding on the United
States and its courts and agencies).
71. Memorandum of the United States, at 3, 17, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R.
147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
72. Id. at 6 n.6.
73. Id. at 3-4.
74. Id. at 17-19.
75. Case 9647, paras. 38(a), (b), INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71,
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leged that the drafters of the American Declaration deleted language
limiting the use of capital punishment from the original version of the
right-to-life article76 because they intended to leave the issue of the
death penalty to the discretion of individual nations.
The United States also attacked petitioners' reliance on the articles
of the American Declaration that protect children and forbid cruel, in-
famous, or unusual punishments to support a prohibition against juve-
nile executions.78 Noting that both the American Convention and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the death
penalty only under their right-to-life articles, the United States claimed
that capital punishment was not cruel, infamous, or unusual punish-
ment under article XXVI because of the diverse death penalty legisla-
tion in force at the time of its adoption.79
The United States further disagreed with petitioners' definition of
"children" in the article of the Declaration that affords special protec-
tion to children as meaning persons under eighteen.80 While acknowl-
edging that one meaning of "children" is "minors," or persons who
have not come of age, the United States argued that varying state prac-
tice regarding the age of majority precluded using the provision of the
doe. 9 rev. I (1987) (outlining arguments of the United States concerning silence of the
American Declaration on the issue of the death penalty).
76. See United States Reply at 1-2, Case 9647, INTER-Aht. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.
L./V/II.71, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (citing Novena Conferencia Internacional Americana,
5 Acta y Documentos 449 for the proposition that the original version of article I of the
American Declaration limited imposition of the death penalty. The original version of
article I limited the death penalty to cases in which a preexisting law established such
a penalty for exceptionally grave crimes. Id. The United States alleged that the variety
of legislation on capital punishment in the hemisphere prevented agreement on a com-
mon statement of principle. Id. at 3. This caused the drafters to delete any references
to the death penalty from the final version of the right-to-life article. Id.
77. See United States Reply at 3, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.
L./V/II.71, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (noting the variety of legislation regarding capital
punishment among individual states).
78. Memorandum of the United States at 4-6, Case 9647, INTER-Ar.. C.H.R. 147,
OEA/ser. L./V/11.71, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
79. Brief of Petitioner at 42 n.80, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser.
L./V/II.71, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1987). Petitioners countered this argument with evidence
that the death penalty for juveniles was rare and unusual. Id. Petitioners also attacked
the reasoning of the United States:
[I]t is clear that numerous examples could be found of legislation and practice
existing at the adoption of the Declaration which could be seen as violating
rights drafted into the Declaration. Normal international practice seeks to bring
restrictive national legislation into conformity with international human rights
aspirations and not the reverse.
Id. at 42 (quoting Shelton, Abortion and the Right to Life in the Inter-American Sys-
ten. The Case of 'Baby Boy, 2 Hum. RTS. L.J. 309, 314 (1981)).
80. Memorandum of the United States at 5, Case 9647, INTER-AMa. C.H.R. 147,
OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
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Declaration that protects children to establish eighteen as the minimum
age for imposition of the death penalty. 8'
Additionally, the United States opposed petitioners' argument that
the Commission should interpret the American Declaration only ac-
cording to article 31 of the Vienna Convention.82 The United States
denied that the language of the relevant articles was unambiguous, and
claimed that consultation of the travaux prkparatoires therefore was
appropriate. 8 The United States opposed the use of the American Con-
vention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to
interpret the American Declaration on two grounds. First, the United
States disputed the power of the Commission to apply provisions of the
Convention and the Covenant to a state not a party to these agree-
ments. 4 The United States then denied petitioners' contention that the
Convention's prohibition of executions for crimes committed by persons
under eighteen codified a norm of customary international law. The
United States argued that the purpose of article 4(5) of the Convention
was rather to create uniformity where none previously had existed.88
81. Id. The United States noted that the drafters of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights specifically distinguished "children" from "persons under
eighteen," considering "children" as a more flexible definition, and not equivalent to
any particular age. Id. at n.5 (quoting 12 U.N. GAOR Annex C.3 (Agenda Item 33,
addendum part 1) at 10-11, 13 U.N. Doc. A/2764 (1957)).
82. Id. at 6; see supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (outlining petitioners'
argument that most nations refrain from executing individuals under 18).
83. Memorandum of the United States at 6, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147,
OEA/ser. L./V/I1.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). Additionally, the United States denied that
the Vienna Convention applied to the American Declaration at all, disputing the Com-
mission's earlier finding that the Declaration acquired binding force with the adoption
of the revised OAS Charter. Id. at n.6; see Case 2141, para. 16, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 25,
38, OEA/ser. L./V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981) (noting that the OAS Charter acquired
binding force as a result of the Protocol of Buenos Aires).
84. Memorandum of the United States at 7-8, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147,
OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The United States relied on language used
in Case 2141: "it would be impossible to impose upon . . . any ... Member State of the
OAS, by means of 'interpretation,' an international obligation based upon a treaty that
such State has not duly accepted or ratified." Case 2141, para. 31, INTER-AM. C.H.R.
25, 43, OEA/ser. L./V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981). Petitioners noted that this language
was obiter dictum, however, because it was unnecessary to the decision in Case 2141.
Brief of Petitioner at 30, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). This language also ignores article 18 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. See supra notes 61-63 (noting that a State, between the signing
and ratifying of a treaty, must refrain from acts that defeat the object and purpose of
the treaty).
85. Case 9647, para. 38(g), INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 159, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.71,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The United States noted that one delegate to the Conference at
which the American Convention was drafted suggested replacing the specific minimum
age in article 4, para. 5 with a reference to "minors," and that the United States
proposed deleting the article altogether. Memorandum of the United States at 10, Case
9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (quoting
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Similarly, the United States claimed that the purpose of the prohibition
of juvenile executions in the International Covenants was to impose a
norm not universally accepted at the time of its drafting."
Moreover, the United States denied that a customary norm prohibit-
ing the use of the death penalty on minors who had committed crimes
had developed since the drafting of the International Covenant and the
American Convention.87 The United States contended that the age of
majority for purposes of imposing the death penalty was not a matter
of uniform state practice. Furthermore, it denied the existence of
opinio juris required to establish a customary norm of international
law.8" The United States alleged that any changes in legislation under-
taken after a state ratified either the American Convention or the In-
ternational Covenant could not be taken as evidence of a belief that a
customary international legal obligation existed.8 9
In addition, the United States asserted that it had dissented from the
minimum age standard stated in the American Convention and the In-
ternational Covenant. The United States delegate abstained from par-
ticipation in either the debate or the vote on the draft Covenant, and
Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, Annotations on the Draft
Inter-American Convention on Protection of Human Rights, O.A/ser. K./XVI/1.1,
doc. 40 corr. 1, at 2-3 (1969)). Based on its comments contained in the travaux
prparatoires, the United States delegation appeared concerned only that setting spe-
cific age limits on the exercise of the death penalty did not adequately take into ac-
count the "already apparent" trend toward gradual abolition of the death penalty. See
T. BUERGENTHAL & R. NORRIS, Observations and Proposed Amendments to the Draft
of the Inter-American Convention on Protection of Human Rights, in 2 HUM1AN
RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (T. Buergenthal & R. Norris, eds. 1983)
Booklet No. 14, at 152 [hereinafter T. Buergenthal & R. Norris] (noting that every
human being has the inherent right to life).
86. Memorandum of the United States at 9, Case 9647, INrER-Ar.I. C.H.R. 147,
OEA/ser. L./V/ll.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The specific age restriction in article 6(5)
of the International Covenant was adopted by a vote of 21 to 19, with 28 abstentions.
Id. at 13.
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id. at 14-15. The United States claimed that petitioners had failed to show that
those states that have adopted 18 as the minimum age for imposition of the death
penalty did so from a sense of international legal obligation. Id. It argued, instead, that
the proliferation of state laws accepting this norm reflected only domestic policy deci-
sions. Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 15-16. The United States relied on the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.) (W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43-44 (Judgment of Feb.
20):
[O]ver half the States concerned.., were or shortly became parties to the Ge-
neva Convention, and were therefore presumably, so far as they were concerned,
acting actually or potentially in the application of the Convention. From their
action no inference could legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of
customary international law in favor of the equidistance principle.
rd. at 16 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.) (W. Ger. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
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President Carter proposed a reservation to the articles that set eighteen
as the minimum age for application of the death penalty when submit-
ting the International Covenant and the American Convention to the
Senate for advice and consent.9 0 The United States concluded that
"[t]here is no basis in international law for applying to the United
States a standard taken from treaties to which it is not a party and that
it has indicated it will not accept when it becomes a party.
1
IV. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
After summarizing the facts of the case and the submissions of the
parties, the Commission proceeded with the substance of its opinion.
The Commission stated that the sole issue was "whether the absence of
a federal prohibition within United States domestic law on the execu-
tion of juveniles who committed serious crimes under the age of eigh-
teen was inconsistent with human rights standards applicable to the
United States under the Inter-American system. '92
The Commission first reaffirmed its previous holding that the Ameri-
can Declaration was binding on the United States as a member state of
the OAS. 93 The Commission also noted that, with respect to OAS
member states not parties to the American Convention, the human
rights which the Commission exists to protect and promote are those
set forth in the American Declaration. 4 The American Declaration is
silent on the issue of capital punishment; consequently, the Commission
90. Id. at 17-18. See Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, Message from the
President of the United States, S. Exec. Doc. C, D, E, & F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. xii,
xvii (1978). The proposed reservation to the International Covenant stated: "The
United States reserves the right to impose capital punishment on any person duly con-
victed under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment."
Memorandum of the United States at 18, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/
ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The proposed reservation to the American Con-
vention stated: "United States adherence to Article 4 is subject to the Constitution and
other law of the United States." Id.
91. Memorandum of the United States at 18-19, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R.
147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
92. Case 9647, para. 43, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 164, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc.
9 rev. 1 (1987). Petitioners had not claimed that the absence of such legislation was
itself a violation of the international obligations of the United States. Brief of Peti-
tioner at 43-44, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/11,71, doc. 9 rev.
1 (1987). Rather, they claimed that the failure of the United States to intercede on
behalf of Roach and Pinkerton violated its obligation to protect human rights within its
borders. Id. at 44.
93. Case 9647, para. 48, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 166, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc.
9 rev. 1 (1987); Case 2141, para. 16, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 25, 38, OEA/ser. L./V/I1.54,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981).
94. Case 9647, para. 49, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 166, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc.
9 rev. 1 (1987).
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turned to the question of the existence of a norm of customary interna-
tional law prohibiting imposition of the death penalty on persons for
crimes committed before they reach the age of eighteen."
The Commission listed the elements of a norm of customary interna-
tional law, and summarized the variety of state practices within the
United States regarding the age at which juvenile offenders may be
tried as adults and subjected to the death penalty."' It then found that
there is no current customary norm of international law establishing
eighteen as the minimum age for the imposition of the death penalty.
The Commission, however, did not completely adopt the argument of
the United States against the existence of a norm. As a result of the
number of states ratifying international agreements establishing eigh-
teen as the minimum age for imposition of the death penalty, the Com-
mission found an "emerging" norm."8
In any case, the Commission stated that such a rule "does not bind
States which protest the norm."9 9 The Commission decided that such a
norm, if it existed, could not bind the United States, because of the
proposed reservations of the United States government to articles 4 and
5 of the American Convention.100
The Commission then observed that a customary norm of interna-
tional law can bind a state that had protested it only if the norm has
acquired the status of jus cogens.101 The Commission considered this
issue although the petitioners had not argued it, and concluded that "in
95. Id. at para. 50. Although the Commission did not explicitly mention the Vi-
enna Convention, it apparently followed petitioners' suggestion that it should interpret
the American Declaration according to the canons of interpretation of the Vienna Con-
vention. See infra note 140 (noting that the Commission used the canons of interpreta-
tion of the Vienna Convention).
96. Case 9647, para 58, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 171, OEA/ser. L./V/ll.71, doc.
9 rev. 1 (1987). Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have abolished the death
penalty entirely. Id. Eleven states that retain the death penalty require a minimum age
of 18 for its application. V. Streib, Minimum Statutory Ages for the Death Penalty,
(April 28, 1987) (unpublished memorandum), para. 3. Nineteen additional states con-
sider age as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Id. at para. 5.
97. Case 9647, para. 60, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 172, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doe.
9 rev. 1 (1987).
98. Id. It is unclear why the Commission found it necessary to note this emerging
norm, because it went on to state that it did not consider the age question dispositive of
the issue before it. Id. at para. 61.
99. Id. at para. 52.
100. Id. at paras. 53-54.
101. Id. at para. 54. The Commission quoted from the Vienna Convention defini-
tion of jus cogens: "a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." Id. at para. 54 n.1
(quoting article 53 of the Vienna Convention).
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the member States of the OAS there is recognized a norm of jus
cogens which prohibits the State execution of children." '
The Commission did not find that the executions of Roach and Pin-
kerton violated this peremptory norm, however, because it could not
discern agreement as to the age of majority for the purposes of the new
jus cogens norm. Instead, the Commission discussed what it perceived
as the principal problem of the case: differing state practices within the
United States regarding the transfer of juveniles to criminal courts for
trial, and possible punishment, as adults.103 In so doing, the Commis-
sion again acted sua sponte, raising an issue and implicating an article
of the American Declaration that petitioners had not argued. 0 4 Addi-
tionally, the facts of the Roach and Pinkerton cases did not present this
issue. 05
The Commission ultimately held that the United States had, indeed,
violated the American Declaration. It did not so hold specifically be-
cause the United States had failed to prevent the executions of Roach
and Pinkerton, nor even because the American Declaration forbade
their executions per se. Rather, the Commission based its decision on
the variety of individual state practices within the United States re-
specting the death penalty:
The Commission finds that the diversity of state practice in the United States..
• results in very different sentences for the commission of the same crime ....
Under the present system of laws in the United States, a hypothetical sixteen
year old who commits a capital offense in Virginia may potentially be subject to
the death penalty, whereas if the same individual commits the same offense on
the other side of the Memorial Bridge, in Washington, D.C., where the death
penalty has been abolished for adults as well as for juveniles, the sentence will
not be death. 00
The Commission then stated its holding:
The failure of the federal government to preempt the states as regards this most
fundamental right - the right to life - results in a pattern of legislative arbi-
trariness throughout the United States which results in the arbitrary deprivation
of life and inequality before the law, contrary to Articles I and II of the Ameri-
102. Id. at para. 56.
103. Id. at para. 57.
104. See American Declaration, supra note 3, (guaranteeing the right to equality
before the law). Petitioners alleged that the United States had violated articles I, VII,
and XXVI. Case 9647, para. 6, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 148, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
105. See supra note 20 (noting that neither Roach nor Pinkerton was transferred
from a juvenile court for trial as an adult, because each was beyond juvenile court
jurisdiction at the time of his offense).
106. Case 9647, para. 62, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 172, OEA/ser. L./V/I1.71, doe.
9 rev. 1 (1987).
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can Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, respectively."
The Commission thus based its finding that the United States had vio-
lated the American Declaration on an article that petitioners never sug-
gested had been violated, and on an issue that neither petitioners nor
the United States had been given the opportunity to argue.
V. ISSUES RAISED BY THE COMMISSION'S OPINION
The Commission's holding raises two issues: the binding character of
the American Declaration with respect to the United States, and the
legality of a federal government leaving the administration of criminal
justice to the discretion of its constituent states. The rest of the discus-
sion in the opinion is obiter dicta, because it is unnecessary for the
Commission's holding. These dicta nonetheless raise additional issues:
the existence of a customary international norm fixing eighteen as the
minimum age for the death penalty, and its role in the interpretation of
the American Declaration; the status of the United States as an objec-
tor to such a norm; and the existence of a peremptory international
norm prohibiting the execution of children.
A. THE AMERICAN DECLARATION IS BINDING ON THE UNITED
STATES
Perhaps the most encouraging element of the opinion of the Commis-
sion is its reaffirmation of the binding character of the American Dec-
laration on OAS member states. 0 8 The American Declaration was not
initially promulgated as a treaty.109 It is generally accepted, however,
that the Protocol of Buenos Aires, which revised the OAS Charter, in-
corporated the Declaration by reference. 10 Although the Commission
previously had held that the American Declaration is binding on the
United States, the Roach case marks the first time the Commission has
found the United States in violation of the Declaration. 1 Additionally,
107. Id. at para. 63.
108. See id. at paras. 46-48 (noting that the United States, as a member of the
OAS, must follow the American Declaration). This reaffirmation was unanimous, be-
cause even the Commission member who dissented from the Roach decision stated that
the American Declaration was binding on the United States. Id. at 5 (dissenting opin-
ion of Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra).
109. M. MONROY CABRA, Los DERECHOS HUMANOS 103 (1980).
110. Shelton, supra note 80, at 312-33. Thomas Buergenthal propounded this view
initially in 1975. Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of
Human Rights, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 828, 833-36 (1975).
111. See Shelton, supra note 79, at 310, 313 (noting that although the Commission
held, in Case 2141, para. 16, IrNrER-Am. C.H.R. 25, 38, OEA/ser. L./V/II.54, doe. 9
rev. 1 (1981), that the American Declaration had acquired binding force through
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the United States is gradually accepting the binding nature of the
American Declaration. The United States disputed the American Dec-
laration's binding character in a footnote of its submission to the Com-
mission, 12 and very briefly in its unsuccessful petition for reconsidera-
tion in Roach, although it has not formally and strenuously objected to
that aspect of the Roach decision, as it did in the decision in Case
2141.113
B. MEANING OF THE ROACH DECISION FOR FEDERAL STATES
The substantive holding of the Commission was that the United
States, by allowing individual states to adopt varying legislation with
respect to the death penalty, denied Roach and Pinkerton equality
before the law. Article II of the American Declaration states: "All per-
sons are equal before the law and have the rights and duties established
in this declaration, without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed
or any other factor."
The decision of the Commission, finding a violation of article II, may
imply that the United States federal system of criminal justice violates
international law. This broad holding is impractical, if not absurd, with
respect to United States law. The holding also makes no sense in inter-
national law. Although the American Declaration has no federal
clause, other international agreements have recognized, implicitly and
explicitly, the legitimacy of federal systems of government.1 14 The fed-
eral clause of the American Convention specifically leaves enforcement
of its provisions to the constituent members of federal states:
"With respect to the provisions over whose subject matter the constituent units
of the federal state have jurisdiction, the national government shall immediately
take suitable measures, in accordance with its constitution and its laws, to the
end that the competent authorities of the constituent units may adopt appropri-
ate provisions for the fulfillment of this Convention."'1
The American Convention thus acknowledges that a federal system of
amendments to the OAS Charter, the Commission found that the United States had
committed no violation).
112. Memorandum of the United States at 6 n.6, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R.
147, OEA/ser. L./V/11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
113. Telephone interview with Christina Cerna, Commission Counsel (July 23,
1987). Following the decision in Case 2141, the United States Department of State
sent a letter of protest to the Commission, claiming that the American Declaration did
not apply to the United States. Id.
114. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 44, art.
50 (noting that "[t]he provisions of the present covenant shall extend to all parts of
federal states without any limitations or exceptions").
115. American Convention, supra note 2, art. 28(2).
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government is not, in itself, contrary to international law.
Even if the holding of the Commission indicates that the United
States should use the eighth amendment as a federal means of abolish-
ing the death penalty for juveniles, the decision is unlikely to influence
the United States Supreme Court in its resolution of the Thompson
case.11 6 The Commission found that the failure of the United States to
establish a uniform minimum age at which a state may subject juvenile
offenders to the death penalty leads to arbitrary deprivation of life and
inequality before the law. The Supreme Court will probably not find
the Commission's rationale persuasive because of its traditional respect
for the substantive criminal laws of individual states.' 7
Under the United States Constitution, all powers not delegated to
the federal government are reserved to the states."" Among those re-
served powers is the so-called "police power," or the power of a state to
enact legislation providing for the welfare of persons and property
within its boundaries."a 9 Historically, the United States Supreme Court
has been unwilling to interfere with states' exercise of this power, strik-
ing down a state law only if it violates the United States Constitu-
tion.120 The Court frequently has held that criminal justice is almost
entirely within the power of individual states . 2 1 For these reasons, the
Court probably will not find the Commission's decision in Roach useful
in interpreting the eighth amendment when it decides Thompson.'2
116. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text (stating that the opinion of the
Commission in the Roach case will have little impact on the United States Supreme
Court due to flawed reasoning and incorrect application of international law in the
opinion).
117. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979) (noting that "[t]he essence
of federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems
and not be forced into a common, uniform mold").
118. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
119. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (acknowledging that the
"police power" resides in state governments).
120. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (noting that law en-
forcement is the prerogative of state governments and therefore the Court should not
"lightly" intrude upon the authority of the states in this area).
121. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) (allowing that states have
wide latitude in fixing punishment for state crimes); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S.
371, 375 (1958) (stating that "the bulk of authority to legislate on what may be com-
pendiously described as criminal justice, which in other nations belongs to the central
government, is under our system the responsibility of the individual States");
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 (1972) (declaring that the classification of
crimes is a state matter).
122. Petitioner Thompson alleges that his execution for a crime committed at the
age of fifteen would constitute a violation of the eighth amendment to the United
States Constitution. Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780, 785 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986),
vacated sub nom. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 56 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1988)
(No. 87-5666). The eighth amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
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The unnecessary reliance of the Commission on the non-discrimina-
tion article of the American Declaration is unfortunate, because the
decision in favor of Roach would have carried persuasive weight had it
been based on the ground urged by petitioners. The Supreme Court
might have looked to the decision of the Commission for guidance in
interpreting the eighth amendment had the Commission found that the
executions of Roach and Pinkerton violated a customary norm of inter-
national law. International law can influence the Supreme Court in ei-
ther of two ways. International standards can aid in the interpretation
of the Constitution or international custom, and agreements can be-
come United States law through article VI of the Constitution. 23
1. The Use of International Law to Interpret the Constitution
International standards are now an established aspect of eighth
amendment analysis, particularly regarding limits on the use of execu-
tions as a penalty. In Enmund v. Florida,"4 the United States Supreme
Court used the "climate of international opinion" as one basis for find-
ing that imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who had not
intended to kill was cruel and unusual punishment. 25 In Coker v.
Georgia,"6 the Court found a Georgia death penalty for rape to be
cruel and unusual punishment, noting that only three major nations
still applied the death penalty for rape. 27
2. International Law as Binding on the States
In addition to using international law to inform provisions of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court also has long recognized that interna-
tional law is part of United States law."28 Treaties to which the United
States is a party become binding on the states through the supremacy
clause of the Constitution. 29 Had the Commission found that the
punishments. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
123. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
124. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982).
125. Id. at 796 n.22.
126. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977).
127. Id. at 596 n.10. See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-3 (1958) (taking
cognizance of the practices of other nations in the Court's determination that denatu-
ralization as punishment for desertion violates the eighth amendment); see generally
Hartman, supra note 42 (declaring that the Court is legally bound by the law of
nations).
128. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (asserting that interna-
tional law is part of United States law); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch.) 388, 422
(1815) (declaring that the Court is legally bound by the law of nations).
129. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
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American Declaration prohibited the death penalty for crimes commit-
ted by persons under eighteen, the Supreme Court might have found its
decision binding on the state of Oklahoma in Thompson's case. 130
A customary norm of international law could also prevent Thomp-
son's execution. 131 In addition to the custom and practice of nations, 32
the Supreme Court will look at the decisions of international tribunals
to determine international law in the absence of a treaty. 33 The Com-
mission regrettably has lost its opportunity to be of significant aid to
both the Supreme Court and petitioner Thompson by basing its deci-
sion on the lack of a federal legislative or judicial prohibition of juve-
nile executions.3
As the broad and narrow readings of the opinion of the Commission
demonstrate, its holding calls into question the legality under the
American Declaration of any death penalty, and even of any federal
system of criminal justice. One interpretation of the opinion indicates
130. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text (explaining that, according to
the Commission, the United States violates the American Declaration because of the
diversity of state practices regarding capital punishment). See also Buergenthal, supra
note 110, at 835 (arguing that the human rights provisions of the American Declara-
tion derive their normative character from the OAS Charter).
131. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 131(1) (Tent. Draft. No. 6, 1985) (asserting that international law is
supreme over the law of the several states of the United States).
132. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (observing that interna-
tional law is part of United States law and that when there is no treaty, executive or
legislative act, or judicial decision to guide the Court, the Court looks to international
law and custom).
133. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 132(1) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (stating that "[i]nternational law is deter-
mined and interpreted in the United States by reference to the sources of international
law cited in § 102, and the evidence of international law indicated in § 103, with par-
ticular attention to the decisions of international tribunals" (emphasis added)). Cf.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-84 (2d Cir. 1980) (relying in part on the
resolutions of public international bodies to find a norm prohibiting torture).
134. The finding of the Commission that no customary norm exists establishing 18
as the minimum age for imposition of the death penalty actually could damage Thomp-
son's case. Both Amnesty International and the International Human Rights Law
Group have filed briefs amicus curiae arguing that Thompson's execution would violate
international law. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Amnesty International in Support of
Petitioner at 18, Thompson v. Oklahoma, cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987). va-
cated, 56 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1988) (arguing that execution of Thompson
would violate international law); Brief for Anicus Curiae International Human Rights
Law Group in Support of Petitioner at 18, Thompson v. Oklahoma, cert. granted, 107
S. Ct. 1284 (1987), vacated, 56 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1988) (arguing that
there is an internationally recognized legal standard prohibiting the execution of juve-
nile offenders); Brief for Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law Group in
Support of Petitioner at 6, Thompson v. Oklahoma, cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284
(1987), vacated, 56 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1988) (declaring that customary
international law forbids the execution of juvenile offenders).
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that any death penalty applied in a federal system denies equality
before the law, if even one other jurisdiction within the same federal
state has abolished the death penalty. Carried to its logical limit, the
Commission's holding can be interpreted to mean that variation in
criminal laws of any kind among the various jurisdictions of a federal
state violates the non-discrimination article of the American Declara-
tion. In addition to creating confusion regarding the significance of
Roach to federal states, the Commission's decision gives no guidance to
states with other domestic systems of government.135
C. THE USE OF CUSTOM TO INTERPRET THE AMERICAN
DECLARATION
Before reaching its holding, the Commission discussed in dicta peti-
tioners' contention that an international norm of customary law forbid-
ding application of the death penalty to persons under eighteen should
be used to inform and interpret the American Declaration.1 36 Petition-
ers argued that the American Declaration should be interpreted ac-
cording to the canons of interpretation of the Vienna Convention,37
which provide that customary international law should be used to inter-
pret a treaty.138
If the American Declaration was incorporated into the OAS Charter
by the Protocol of Buenos Aires,13 9 it is a treaty, and the use of the
Vienna Convention canons of interpretation is therefore appropriate.
The United States disputed the binding force of the American Declara-
tion, however, noting that none of the articles of the revised OAS
Charter cited as incorporating the American Declaration does so ex-
135. Of the twenty OAS member states that retain the death penalty, only Argen-
tina, Brazil and Mexico are federal states. See Amnesty International, supra note 51,
at 2 (listing the three countries as retentionist). The laws of these countries provide for
the death penalty only for exceptional crimes such as crimes under military law or
crimes committed in exceptional circumstances such as wartime. Brief for Amicus Cu-
riae Amnesty International in Support of Petitioner at appendix, Thompson v.
Oklahoma, cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 1284 (1987), vacated, 56 U.S.L.W. 4892 (U.S.
Jun. 29, 1988) (listing abolitionist and retentionist countries as of April 1987).
136. Case 9647, paras. 44-54, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 164-68, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
137. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text (discussing petitioners' conten-
tion that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties dictates the finding that the
prohibition of the execution of persons under 18 has acquired the status of customary
international law).
138. See Vienna Convention, supra note 58, art. 31(3)(c) (stating that nations
should use relevant rules of international law to interpret treaties).
139. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (noting that while the Ameri-
can Declaration was not initially promulgated as a treaty, it is generally accepted that
the Protocol of Buenos Aires incorporated the Declaration by reference).
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plicitly.140 The Commission's apparent use of the Vienna Convention to
interpret the American Declaration, and its reaffirmation of the bind-
ing force of the Declaration, suggest that the American Declaration
has acquired treaty status. The United States has acknowledged that
the Vienna Convention is generally recognized as authoritative on
treaty law and practice; consequently, it seems correct to use custom to
interpret the Declaration. Although the Commission did not specifically
mention the Vienna Convention, it appeared to apply the analysis sug-
gested by petitioners.114 The Roach opinion marks the Commission's
first use, albeit in dicta, of these canons of interpretation. 42
D. EXISTENCE OF A NORM EXEMPTING THOSE UNDER EIGHTEEN
FROM THE DEATH PENALTY
Although the Commission used the approach of the Vienna Conven-
tion to interpret the American Declaration, it failed to find that cus-
tomary international law established eighteen as the minimum age for
imposition of the death penalty. The Commission reached four almost
contradictory conclusions with respect to this issue:
[l]The Commission finds that in the member States of the OAS there is recog-
nized a norm of jus cogens which prohibits the State execution of children." 3
[2]The Commission is convinced by the U.S. Government's argument that there
does not now exist a norm of customary international law establishing eighteen
to be the minimum age for imposition of the death penalty."
[3] Nonetheless .... the norm is emerging."'5
[4]Since the United States has protested the norm, it would not be applicable to
140. Memorandum of the United States at 6 n.6, Case 9647, INTER-Ai. C.H.R.
147, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
141. See Case 9647, para. 50, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/ll.71, doe.
9 rev. 1 (1987) (recapping petitioners' argument that there is a norm of customary
international law that prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on persons under 18
years of age). Additionally, the dissenting opinion states that the Commission used the
Vienna Convention's canons of interpretation. Id. at 175 (dissenting opinion of Dr.
Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra). The dissent states that this use was improper because
the American Declaration is not a public treaty. Id. The dissenter repeats the error the
Commission made in Case 2141 by seeking to interpret the American Declaration us-
ing only the travaux prbparatoires. See id. at 4-5 (arguing that the American Declara-
tion does not regulate the death penalty because it does not mention the death penalty);
see also Shelton, supra note 80, at 310 (summarizing the facts of Case 2141).
142. See Shelton, supra note 79, at 313 (criticizing the Commission's faulty analy-
sis in Case 2141 based on a discussion of the travaux pr~paratoires of the Declaration,
and attributing it to the Commission's disregard of the canons of interpretation of the
Vienna Convention).
143. Case 9647, para. 56, INTER-Abi. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./V/11.71, doc. 9
rev. 1 (1987).
144. Id. at para. 60.
145. Id.
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the United States should it be held to exist. 4
The Commission's failure to develop any rationale for three of the four
findings147 aggravates the confusing quality of these conclusions.
The Commission found that the increasing numbers of states ratify-
ing the American Convention and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights indicate an emerging norm. 48 Otherwise, the
Commission failed to analyze the arguments for or against a customary
international norm. The Commission simply stated several conflicting
conclusions without reasoning.
The Commission apparently did not consider the Fourth Geneva
Convention, another international instrument that forbids the execution
of juveniles. Most of the nations of the world have ratified the Fourth
Geneva Convention.1 49 The Geneva Conventions, of course, apply prin-
cipally to periods of international armed conflict. Article 68 of the
Fourth Convention states: "In any case, the death penalty may not be
pronounced on a [civilian or member of the military no longer in com-
bat] who was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense." 5 0
If a protection against juvenile executions is universally recognized in
the turmoil of war, such a protection should clearly be accepted for
peacetime situations. That nearly all the nations of the world have
agreed to such a norm in periods of international armed conflict could
have provided the Commission with persuasive evidence of the exis-
tence, rather than merely the emerging status, of a similar norm appli-
cable to peacetime.' 5' The Commission thereby may have been overly
cautious when it stated that a customary norm establishing eighteen as
146. Id. at para. 54.
147. 147. The Commission outlined its analysis supporting its conclusion that a jus
cogens norm prohibits the execution of children, id. at para. 55. It provided, however,
only conclusory statements to bolster its other findings regarding a customary norm
forbidding juvenile executions; for example, "[T]he customary rule, however, does not
bind States which protest the norm." Id. at para. 51.
148. Id. at para. 60.
149. One hundred sixty-five nations had ratified the Geneva Conventions as of De-
cember 31, 1986. International Committee of the Red Cross, States Parties to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 1987 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 110, 111.
150. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 44, art. 68.
151. See I RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(3) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (stating that "[i]nternational
agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the creation of
customary international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by
states generally and are in fact widely accepted"). Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf,
(W. Ger. v. Den.) (W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Judgment of Feb. 20) (stating
that "[w]ith respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before a con-
ventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of international law, it
might be that ... a very widespread and representative participation in the convention
might suffice of itself .... ").
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the minimum age for imposition of the death penalty was only emerg-
ing, and not yet in force.' 52 The Commission's apparent compromise
between the positions argued by petitioners and the United States is
dictum in any case.1 53
E. THE STATUS OF THE UNITED STATES AS AN OBJECTOR TO A
CUSTOMARY NORM
Instead of caution, the Commission displayed ignorance of estab-
lished international law in its assertion that a customary rule of inter-
national law does not bind a state that protests it.'" International law
provides that a state may prevent itself from becoming bound by a rule
of customary law if it maintains explicit, disciplined and consistent op-
position to the rule. 55 The Commission's opinion held the United
States exempt from any customary norm fixing eighteen as the mini-
mum age for the death penalty with the following language: "[s]ince
the United States has protested the norm, it would not be applicable to
the United States should it be held to exist." The Commission did not
apply the persistent objector principle; indeed, it never even used the
term "persistent objector."
The Commission noted only that the United States Department of
State had proposed a reservation to the articles of the American Con-
vention exempting those under eighteen from the death penalty when
submitting the document to the United States Senate for advice and
152. The International Court of Justice, in a recent case, stated that the Geneva
Conventions represent, in some respects, no more than the expression of fundamental
principles of humanitarian law. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June 27) cited in Meron, The
Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. IN''L L. 348, 352 (1987).
153. The Commission itself noted that its finding of an emerging norm establishing
18 as the minimum age at which the death penalty may be applied was not dispositive
of the issue before it. Case 9647, para. 61, INTER-Am. C.H.R. 147, 172, OEA/scr. L./
V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The dissenter on the Commission, although analyzing the
issue of the existence of a customary norm more thoroughly than the majority, con-
cluded that no such norm existed. Id. at 177-80 (dissenting opinion of Dr. Marco Ge-
rardo Monroy Cabra). The dissenter would require unanimous ratification of a treaty
provision, or near-universal, long-standing, state practice, in order to find that an inter-
national customary norm exists. Id. at 178.
154. See Case 9647, para. 52, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 167, OEA/ser. L./V/lI.71,
doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (asserting that customary international law does not bind states
that protest the existence of that norm).
155. Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Dec. 18);
Schachter, Nature and Process of Legal Development in International Society, in
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 745, 779 (R. MacDonald & D.
Johnston eds. 1983) [hereinafter Schachter]l Stein, The Approach of the Different
Drummer: The Principle of Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 457, 479 (1985).
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consent to ratification. 156 The Commission found these proposed reser-
vations to be sufficient protest to exempt the United States from a cus-
tomary international rule forbidding application of the death penalty
for crimes committed by persons under eighteen. 157 Had the Commis-
sion instead applied the analysis required by the persistent objector
principle, it would have found that United States opposition to a norm
establishing eighteen as the minimum age for imposition of the death
penalty has been equivocal at best, and that the United States does not
qualify as a persistent objector to such a norm.158
The first appearance of a prohibition of juvenile execution (i.e. those
under eighteen) in an international agreement was article 68, para-
graph 4 of the Fourth Geneva Convention." 9 The United States signed
and ratified this agreement without asserting any opposition to article
68, paragraph 4. To qualify as a persistent objector to a customary
international norm, a state must show that it expressed open dissent to
the rule during the formation of the rule. 60 In addition, such dissent
must be consistent throughout the development of the rule.'61 As re-
156. Case 9647, para. 53, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 167, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doe.
9 rev. 1 (1987); Letters of Transmittal and Submittal, with suggested reservations,
understandings, and declarations November 1978 in BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GEN-
ERAL FOREIGN POLICY SERIES 310, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 8961, SELECTED
DOCUMENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS (1980) (transmitting proposed reservation of the Ameri-
can Declaration from the United States Department of State to the United States
Senate).
157. Case 9647, paras. 53-54, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 167-68, OEA/ser. L./V/
11.71, doe. 9 rev. 1 (1987). The reservations were merely proposals internally transmit-
ted from the executive to the legislative branch of the United States. Id. The United
States has not yet ratified the American Convention. Id. The United States has there-
fore not officially communicated this protest to the international community.
158. See (Response of the Department of State to the "Critique of Reservations to
the International Human Rights Covenants" by the Lawyers Committee for Interna-
tional Human Rights), International Human Rights Treaties; Hearing before the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 55 (1979) (denying that the
State Department was attempting to perpetuate the right to execute minors). When
proposing its reservations to articles 4 and 5 of the American Convention, the State
Department specifically denied that it sought to preserve a right to execute juveniles.
Id. Additionally, the United States declined to participate in the debates concerning
the drafting of the limitation of the death penalty contained in the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. Hartman, supra note 42, at 684. The United States
representative eventually voted in favor of adoption of the International Covenant with-
out expressing concern over its prohibition of juvenile executions. V. BITE, THE UNITED
STATES AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: A SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS
AND STATUS IN THE RATIFICATION PROCESS 17 [hereinafter V. BITE] (Foreign Affairs
and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service Report No. 83-175 F.
1983).
159. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 44, art. 68.
160. Schachter, supra note 155, at 779.
161. Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Judgment of
Dec. 18).
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cently as 1969, the United States acquiesced in the drafting of article
4(5) of the American Convention, which forbids application of the
death penalty to persons under eighteen. 2  The United States delega-
tion to the drafting conference actually made a statement supporting
the development of a norm abolishing the death penalty in its recom-
mendation to remove the specific age limit in article 4(5):
The proscription of capital punishment within arbitrary age limits presents vari-
ous difficulties in law, and fails to take account of the general trend, already
apparent, for the gradual abolition of the death penalty... For this reason we
believe the text will be stronger and more effective if this paragraph is deleted.1t 3
The Commission failed to note the less than consistent nature of
United States protest of a customary norm prohibiting juvenile execu-
tions, apparently because of its ignorance of the persistent objector
principle. No international body or legal scholar previously has consid-
ered that a state's single, internal protest of a norm of international law
is sufficient to exempt that state from the binding force of the norm.",
The Commission's discussion of the effect of United States protest of a
customary norm is dictum that ignores both the applicable law and the
relevant facts.
F. THE EXISTENCE OF A JUS COGENS NORM FORBIDDING THE
EXECUTION OF CHILDREN
The Commission's erroneous analysis of the status of the United
States under a customary international norm forbidding juvenile execu-
tions forced it to use the doctrine of jus cogens to find that the United
States could not execute children. The Commission found that the in-
ternational law norm forbidding execution of children has acquired the
authority of jus cogens, a norm whose compelling character overrides
even treaties.'65 A jus cogens norm is a peremptory rule of interna-
162. V. BITE, supra note 158, at 17. The United States eventually voted in favor of
the American Convention, and President Carter signed the Convention on June 1,
1977, without any comment regarding the provision prohibiting juvenile executions. Id.
163. T. Buergenthal & R. Norris, supra note 85, Booklet no. 14, at 152 (emphasis
added).
164. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 comment d (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (noting that dissent and
consequent exemption from a principle that became general customary law historically
has been rare). Cf. Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116
(Judgment of Dec. 18) (holding that Norway had successfully dissented from a cus-
tomary norm by actually maintaining a four-mile territorial sea, although a three-mile
zone was generally accepted).
165. Case 9647, para. 56, INTER-A. C.H.R. 147, 170, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc.
9 rev. 1 (1987). The Commission did not define "children" in its opinion. The Commis-
sion found no customary norm establishing 18 as the minimum age for application of
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tional law that prevails over any conflicting international rule or agree-
ment."'6 A jus cogens norm permits no derogation, and can be modified
only by a subsequent international law norm of the same character.16 7
The concept of jus cogens is of relatively recent origin, although it is
incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 8 Its
content is disputed, and thus far only the principles of the United Na-
tions Charter prohibiting the use of force are generally agreed to be jus
cogens.'"9 The International Court of Justice appeared to find that a
peremptory norm of international law establishes the inviolability of en-
voys and embassies in its judgment concerning Iranian treatment of the
United States diplomatic and consular staff in Tehran.17 0 Commenta-
tors have suggested that prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and ra-
cial discrimination also have acquired jus cogens status.1
The petitioners neither suggested nor refuted the Commission's find-
ing that a rule of jus cogens prohibits the execution of children.172
the death penalty and it did not equate "children" with all those under the age of 18.
Id. at para. 57. In contrast to the Commission's view, the United Nations Draft Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child defines "child" as "every human being to the age of
18 years unless, under the law of his State, he has attained his age of majority earlier."
Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, 42
U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights (Agenda Item 13) art. 1, U.N. Doc. E[
CN.4/1986/39 (1986). The Draft Convention also forbids application of the death
penalty to those who were under 18 at the time of their offense. Id. art. 19, para. 2(b).
166. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 comment k (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
167. Id.
168. Vienna Convention, supra note 58, arts. 53, 64.
169. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 reporter's note 6 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
170. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 31, 41 (Judgment of May 24).
Whatever extenuation of the responsibility to be attached to the conduct of the
Iranian authorities may be found in the offence felt by them because of the ad-
mission of the Shah to the United States could not affect the imperative charac-
ter of the legal obligations incumbent upon the Iranian Government which is not
altered by a state of diplomatic tension between the two countries.
Id. at 41.
See also id. at 42 (citing United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
(U.S. v. Iran) 1979 I.C.J. 19, 19 (Interim Order of Dec. 15) (stating that "there is no
more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the
inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, so that throughout history nations of
all creeds and cultures have observed reciprocal obligations for that purpose")).
171. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 reporter's note 6 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (1979).
172. Case 9647, para. 54, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 168, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.71, doc.
9 rev. 1 (1987). The Commission noted this fact but stated that, as a non-judicial body,
it was not limited to considering only the submissions presented by the parties to a
dispute. Id.
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Moreover, after declaring the existence of a jus cogens norm forbidding
the execution of children, the Commission declined to apply the norm
to the execution of Roach. Had the Commission found, instead, that
the prohibition against executing juveniles was a customary, though not
peremptory, rule of international law, its decision would have accorded
more closely with the applicable precedents, with petitioners' argu-
ments, and with the practice of nations.173
VI. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH THE ROACH
DECISION
Even though the Commission failed to hold execution of juvenile of-
fenders violative of the American Declaration, the United States gov-
ernment could still choose to abolish juvenile executions if it corrects
the discriminatory state practice that the Commission held violates the
American Declaration. Federal establishment of a uniform prohibition
against juvenile execution could constitutionally occur in several ways.
The Supreme Court, of course, could rule that the execution of persons
for capital offenses committed while under eighteen constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Even if
the Supreme Court decides in Thompson that imposition of the death
penalty for those under eighteen who commit crime does not violate the
eighth amendment, Congress has the legal authority to ensure United
States compliance with the decision of the Commission. Under the en-
forcement section of the fourteenth amendment, Congress has the
power to enact legislation forbidding the execution of juveniles. 7 4 Con-
gress also could encourage individual states to enact such legislation if
it makes the receipt of federal funds contingent on the states' excluding
juveniles from the death penalty. 17  If the Supreme Court decides
against Thompson, Congress, for political reasons, will probably not at-
173. MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW § 3.14 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968).
International law recognizes the existence of regional custom, a norm whose observance
and validity is limited to a particular group of states. Id. No international body or legal
scholar, however, has previously suggested the existence of a doctrine of regional jus
cogens. Id. The Commission held that the jus cogens norm against execution of chil-
dren existed among the member states of the OAS, but failed to fully address this
question. Case 9647, para. 56, INTER-Ahi. C.H.R. 147, 170, OEA/ser. L./V/Il.71, dc.
9 rev. 1 (1987). The dissenting opinion, issued more than a month after the decision of
the Commission, states that there can be no such "American jus cogens." Id. at 14(dissenting opinion of Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra).
174. See U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that "the Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
175. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I (stating that "the Congress shall have the
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises to pay the debts and provide
for the common defence and general welfare of the United States .... "').
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tempt to reverse that decision through legislation.17
A. THE ENFORCEMENT SECTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Under section five of the fourteenth amendment, Congress may cre-
ate legislation to protect any class of citizens denied due process or
equal protection under the laws of the United States.1 7 The Supreme
Court will uphold legislation enacted under this broad power only if the
legislation is "plainly adapted to [the] end" of enforcing the equal pro-
tection clause, and is "consistent with the letter and spirit of the Con-
stitution."17 8 Congress could find, under the fourteenth amendment,
that the punishment of execution violates juveniles' due process rights
to fundamental fairness and their rights to equal protection under the
laws. Although minors share in the benefits and protections of the Con-
stitution,1 9 they are not legally equal to adults. Application of the
death penalty to juveniles violates the guarantees of due process and
equal protection because the state imposes restraints on juveniles, but
at the same time the state may subject juveniles to adult penalties.180
Congress could combat this discrimination using its power under sec-
tion five of the fourteenth amendment. The enactment of federal legis-
lation forbidding the execution of juveniles would result in United
States compliance with the Commission's decision in Roach.
B. THE CONGRESSIONAL SPENDING POWER
Congress also could pass legislation encouraging individual states to
176. See Nathanson, Congressional Power to Contradict the Supreme Court's
Constitutional Decisions: Accommodation of Rights in Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 331, 339 n.48 (1986) (noting that Congress generally has avoided constitutional
confrontations with the Supreme Court, and that legislative proposals hostile to the
Court's constitutional decisions most often have not passed). But cf. McCleskey v.
Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987) (upholding the death sentence of a Georgia black man
convicted of killing a white police officer in spite of statistical data showing that killers
of whites in Georgia received the death penalty approximately eleven times as often as
killers of blacks). The McCleskey decision received strong media criticism. Injustice?
Never Mind, Court Says, The Atlanta Const., Apr. 24, 1987, at 22-A, col. 1. The
decision has prompted a Congressional effort to pass legislation forbidding racially dis-
proportionate capital sentencing. Memorandum from Pat Rengell, Amnesty Interna-
tional USA, to David Weissbrodt (July 24, 1987).
177. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
178. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (quoting standards laid
out in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966) (quoting standards laid out in M'Culloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
179. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
180. Comment, Eddings v. Oklahoma: A Stay of Execution for Juveniles, 9 NEw
ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 407, 423 (1983).
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conform their laws to the Roach decision. Congress can, and often has,
used its spending power 81 to further national policies by making grant
money to states conditional upon the fulfillment of those policies.1 12
Congress may place conditions on federal grant money if the expendi-
tures benefit society at large;18 3 if conditioned grants are within na-
tional power and policy;"" if the condition is directed to the attainment
of a lawful end, for which the nation and state may cooperate; 85 and if
the condition placed on a grant does not result in coercing a state to
accept it without a choice.186 Using its spending power, Congress could
encourage individual state compliance with the Roach decision if it
makes federal grant money to state criminal justice systems conditional
on the states' observing eighteen as the minimum age for application of
the death penalty. Such legislation would further the goal of United
States compliance with international legal obligations without removing
from the states the choice of retaining current laws and foregoing fed-
eral aid.
VII. LESSONS OF ROACH
The errors the Commission made in its opinion in Roach arose
mainly when it strayed from the issues that the parties argued. Al-
though the Commission has been criticized in the past for being too
closely bound by the arguments before it,21 7 the Commission's indepen-
dence in Roach carried it too far afield. Although the Commission
stated that, as a non-judicial body,1 88 it was not limited to considering
only the submissions of the parties,18 9 the Commission's opinion might
181. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
182. See Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (stating
that the federal government may impose reasonable conditions of federal interest).
183. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
184. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937).
185. Id. at 593.
186. Id. at 589-90. The Court recently upheld such use of the congressional spend-
ing power. South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987) (upholding 23 U.S.C. § 158,
which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of federal
highway funds otherwise allocable to the states from any state that sets its legal drink-
ing age below twenty-one). Id. at 2796.
187. See Shelton, supra note 79, at 313, 315 (criticizing the failure of the Commis-
sion to examine the objectives and purposes of international agreements).
188. Regulations of the Commission, supra note 3, art. 1. The Commission's pri-
mary purpose is to promote the observance and defense of human rights. Id. Its proce-
dures for deciding petitions, however, create an adversarial hearing process. Aguilar,
Procedimiento que Debe Aplicar La Comisibn Interamericana de Derechos Humanos
en el Examen de las Peticiones o Comunicaciones Individuales sobre Preguntas Viola-
clones de Derechos Humanos, in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS 199, 211 (1984) [hereinafter Aguilar].
189. Case 9647, para. 54, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 167, OEA/ser. L./V/1I.71, doc.
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have been better-reasoned if the parties had prepared briefs on the is-
sues the Commission raised independently. The Commission may con-
sider elements of proof from sources other than the parties in reaching
its decision. 190 The Commission may even initiate an investigation on
its own motion, without a complaint placed before it. 19' When rela-
tively sophisticated parties fully argue their positions to the Commis-
sion, however, it should avail itself of the views of the parties.192
Whether or not the Commission is a judicial body, it performs an adju-
dicative function, and should use sound decision-making procedures.
Decision-makers who reach beyond the arguments put before them
should at least bring any new line of thinking that is likely to bear on
their decision to the parties' attention for comment.19 3 When the Com-
mission, or any decision-making body, notices an issue that the parties
to a dispute did not raise, it should call the issue to the parties' atten-
tion by requesting supplemental briefing. This procedure will help en-
sure fairness to the parties.""
Deciding cases on issues that the parties did not raise, or on points
only cursorily briefed and argued, can hinder the parties' perception of
the fairness of the adjudication: "It is unfair to decide a case without
giving the losing party opportunity to present information which may
influence the Court's decision."' 95 This principle also has been recog-
nized in international law. 98
9 rev. 1 (1987).
190. Aguilar, supra note 188, at 215.
191. See Regulations of the Commission, supra note 3, art. 26(2) (enumerating the
independent precautionary measures available to the Commission).
192. See Aguilar, supra note 188, at 215 (noting that, in the majority of cases, the
parties present all the evidence that can be collected to support their respective
positions).
193. Richardson, The Role of an Appellate Judge, 5 OTAGO L. REv. 1, 8 (1981).
194. See Note, Appellate Court Sua Sponte Activity: Remaking Disputes and the
Rule of Non-Intervention, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 352, 364 (1967) [hereinafter Sua
Sponte] (arguing that fairness and public acceptability of the trial demands that par-
ties be allowed to brief supplemental issues); cf. Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78
YALE L.J. 1311, 1332 (1969) (suggesting that when a court decides a case on an issue
not briefed, it should at least grant the parties a rehearing, no matter how certain the
court is of the correctness of its decision).
195. Sua Sponte, supra note 194, at 364; see also Christie, supra note 194, at 1331
(noting that the Supreme Court often addresses issues not raised by parties).
196. C. SMITH, THE RELATION BETWEEN PROCEEDINGS AND PREMISES, A STUDY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (1962).
One of the most elementary procedural rights is the right of a party to be heard.
If that be denied, the decision may be considered null. There is of course nor-
mally a great difference between not being heard at all and not being heard as to
the relevant points. But the difference seems to be very much reduced if the
arguments of the parties are entirely ignored.
Id. Cf. S. ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 99 (1973)
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The use of supplemental briefing on issues the Commission raises in-
dependently is also suggested by the Regulations of the Commission.
The Statute and Regulations of the Commission provide for the consid-
eration of petitions submitted to the Commission in an adversarial con-
text.117 The rationale for an adversary system of decision-making is
that self-interest motivates the parties to present the best arguments in
their favor. 198 The rule of the Commission that a petitioner must ex-
haust all domestic legal remedies before appealing to it means that pe-
titioners and governments before it will be quite familiar with all the
arguments in support of their positions.109 In their provision for a hear-
ing on a petition, the Regulations of the Commission suggest a proce-
dure similar to requesting of supplemental briefs. 00
When a decision-maker decides an issue not raised by the parties to
the dispute, it takes risks for the adequacy of the decision-making pro-
cess.20 1 A decision-maker departing from the arguments before it in
search of an alternative basis for resolution of the dispute also runs a
high risk of error.20 2 Although decision-makers cannot always be lim-
ited to consideration of only the arguments that counsel happen to ad-
vance, they should not stray rashly into areas not raised or argued by
the parties. 03 Professor Karl Llewellyn states:
(noting that the International Court of Justice requires parties before it to provide final
submissions indicating what each party considers should be the language of the opera-
tive part of the judgment).
197. See Aguilar, supra note 188, at 210 (stating that the Commission procedures
for deciding petitions create an adversarial hearing process); Statute of the Commis-
sion, supra note 2, art. 19, para. a (granting the Commission power to act on petitions);
Regulations of the Commission, supra note 3, art. 43, para. 1 (stating that the Com-
mission may hold a hearing and summon parties to verify the facts in a petition).
198. T. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION GATHERING
IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 25 (1978). See also Freedman, Arguing the Law in an
Adversary System, 16 GA. L. REv. 833, 839 (1982) [hereinafter T. MARVELL] (stating
that "[t]he adversary system is successfully designed to encourage each side of a legal
dispute to search out and to present to the court the relevant facts, law, and policy
considerations bearing upon matters in dispute").
199. See Regulations of the Commission, supra note 3, art. 37 (providing that prior
to submitting a petition to the Commission all domestic remedies must be exhausted).
200. See id. art. 43(2) (providing that "[a]t that hearing, the Commission may
request any pertinent information from the representative of the state in question and
shall receive, if so requested, oral or written statements presented by the parties
concerned").
201. See T. MARVELL, supra note 198, at 122 (noting the judicial distaste for the
rendering of a decision based on an issue that counsel did not raise or argue).
202. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Cur-
rent Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 385, 416
(1983-84).
203. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMOrN LAW TRADITION 389 (1960) [hereinafter
K. LLEWELLYN] (asserting that "[a] court ought always to be slow in uncharted terri-
tory, and, in such territory, ought to be narrow, again and again, in any ground for
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" [an appellate court in quest of justice can do (and often has done) more refor-
mulating of ill-drawn issues than is generally realized even by lawyers . . .
[njevertheless, such action . . . is both relatively rare and a function of pecu-
liarly sharp pressure from felt need."'"
Another commentator criticized judges' departures from the arguments
of the parties, noting that "deciding issues not raised may produce a
more comprehensive body of law, but the quality of the law may suffer
for being made without the help of counsel."205 Although these com-
ments refer specifically to common law jurisdictions, the process of the
parties bringing before the judge the information necessary to decide
the case is not peculiar to the common law. Even in civil law jurisdic-
tions, the determination of what issues to raise and what evidence to
introduce is left almost entirely to the parties.2 06
The Commission, as an organ of the OAS, must accommodate the
different legal systems of the OAS member states. The majority of
those states have civil law systems.20 7 Although civil and common law
systems differ in many ways, both permit lawyers to provide input in
the decision-making process as adversaries. 20 8 Because of this similar-
ity, a study of the procedure and experience of common law courts has
some relevance for the improvement of the quality of the decision-mak-
ing of the Commission. The experience of the United States Supreme
Court, the most visible and easily-researched United States court, may
provide some help in illustrating the wisdom of allowing the parties to a
dispute to contribute their views as to the basis for the resolution of the
dispute.
It has been recognized that United States courts should refrain from
deciding cases on issues not raised by the parties, though courts unfor-
tunately continue to do so. 209 Courts should not decide cases on new
decision, until the territory has been reasonably explored"); cf. Baier, The Law Clerks:
Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REv. 1125, 1152 (1973) (questioning whether it
is the duty of a judge to protect litigants whose counsel submit weak appellate briefs).
204. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 203, at 29.
205. T. MARVELL, supra note 198, at 125; cf. Williamson, Judicial Activism: Sec-
tion 1983 and Antitrust Liability Chill Decision Making by State and Local Officials,
6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 162 (1983) (observing that "[udicial restraint is] a
doctrine that teaches judges whether, and if so when, they should decide the merits of
questions that litigants press upon them") (quoting Justice Stevens).
206. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 115 (2d ed. 1985).
207. Id. at 2.
208. Id. at 114-15 (criticizing as quite misleading the characterization of civil law
proof-gathering as "inquisitorial" as opposed to the "adversary" system of the common
law).
209. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526, 545-46 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that "our remand leaves the hapless District Judge
with the unenviable task of reassessing non-existent evidence under a theory advanced
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issues without inviting the comments of the parties on those issues. 1'
Although the doctrine of judicial notice allows courts to take notice of
information not offered by the parties in reaching a decision, the doc-
trine requires that the parties be afforded an opportunity to be heard
on such "noticed" information. 11
The United States Supreme Court will ordinarily refrain from decid-
ing issues not raised or resolved in the lower courts. 2 The Court, how-
ever, does have discretionary power to consider a plain error below not
raised by the parties on appeal. 213 If the Court discovers issues over-
looked by the parties, it may accompany its grant of certiorari or not-
by neither of the parties"). In the Roach case the Commission illustrated the infre-
quency of decisions based on issues not raised by denying the request for reconsidera-
tion. Request for Reconsideration, Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, OEA/ser. L./
V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (outlining the reasons of the Commission for its denial of
the Request for Reconsideration).
210. See Conford, Management of the Oral Argument by an Appellate Court, 14
JUDGES' J. 14, 15 (1975), stating that:
Where ... the interests of justice require expansion of the record ... both sides
should be permitted to be heard on the expansion and given an opportunity to
address any new issue by supplemental brief. The same considerations apply if
the court conceives that a just determination of the matter requires the introduc-
tion of a legal issue not raised below or briefed on the appeal. Excursion into
such an issue at argument on the initiative of the court should be followed by the
opportunity for counsel to file supplemental briefs.
Id. at 15.
It might be suggested that a wrong decision based on an issue not raised by the
parties could be remedied by a reversal on rehearing. The extreme infrequency with
which courts grant petitions for rehearing makes that procedure no real remedy at all,
however. See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & S. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACcE 624-
25 (6th ed. 1986) [hereinafter STERN & GRESSMAN] (noting that while 729 requests
for rehearings were filed with the Court between 1976 and 1982, only six petitions were
in fact granted). Similar factors probably motivated the refusal of the Commission to
accept the rather tardy request of the United States for reconsideration in Roach.
211. See FED. R. EvID. 201(e) (stating that "[a] party is entitled upon timely re-
quest to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be
made after judicial notice has been taken"). Rule 201 is a codification of the common
law doctrine allowing judicial notice to be taken of facts about which reasonable per-
sons could not differ. Turner, Judicial Notice and Federal Rule of Evidence 201-A
Rule Ready for a Change, 45 U. PiTr. L. REv. 181, 181 (1983). The rationale for the
requirement that the parties be given an opportunity to be heard on judicially-noticed
facts is that "human judges make mistakes, and one of the functions of adversaries is
to point out mistakes so that they may be corrected." Davis, Judicial Notice, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 945, 979 (1955).
212. See California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 556-57 n.2 (1957) (refusing to con-
sider claim not briefed by the state in the district court); Lawn v. United States, 355
U.S. 339, 362-63 n.16 (1958) (refraining explicitly from reviewing contentions raised
by the parties for the first time on appeal).
213. Sup. C. R. 34.1(a) states: "[a]t its option, however, the Court may consider a
plain error not among the questions presented but evident from the record and other-
wise within its jurisdiction to decide." STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 210, § 13.8, at
553.
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ing of probable jurisdiction with a specification of the additional ques-
tions it wishes briefed and argued.214 This procedure ensures full
argument on points that counsel otherwise would not have briefed
which might be decisive in the Court's disposition of the case. 10
The soundness of this procedure finds support in several cases in
which the Supreme Court has reversed itself on rehearing, or has over-
ruled previous decisions.21 6 The following four cases illustrate various
aspects of how full briefing on all relevant issues, and attention to the
arguments of the parties, can improve decision-making by the Supreme
Court.21
214. STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 210, § 5.11, at 276.
215. Id. Other courts have recognized the soundness of this procedure. See Bel-
lacosa, The Importance of Being an Earnest Clerk, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 74, 76 (1982)
(describing the New York Court of Appeals sua sponte review procedure: "If ... an
impediment is identified no judicial resolution is arrogated by the Clerk. Rather, a
letter is sent to all counsel, thereby converting the sua sponte initiation into a thorough
adversarial participation and exchange"). Id.
216. Between 1810 and 1980, the Supreme Court overturned previous decisions
171 times. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS
AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1789-97, S332-33 (1973
& Supp. 1980) (listing all previous decisions overturned by the United States Supreme
Court). Eight of these overrulings were reversals on rehearing. Id. at 1789-94.
217. It should be noted that these four cases are the exception, rather than the rule,
in Supreme Court overruling of precedents. Overrulings are often a result of a change
in the Court's composition, for example, Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 457 (1871), or a change in United States societal or legal needs, for exam-
ple, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Few Supreme Court overrul-
ings were based on the inadequate consideration of issues in the earlier case. The
Court's narrow restriction of its certiorari jurisdiction might cause petitioners to raise
every possible issue, to improve the chance of the petition being granted. See STERN &
GRESSMAN, supra note 210, at 27 (noting that the Court denies certiorari to 95 percent
of the cases submitted to it). The level of expertise of Supreme Court practitioners also
may render it less necessary for the Court to go beyond the arguments of counsel. The
Court does so on occasion, however. See Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger
Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 645 (1986)
(describing a case in which the Court resolved an issue never raised by the parties to
the case).
Two renowned cases that have not been overruled, in which the Supreme Court went
beyond the arguments of the parties, are Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Lamb, Judicial Policy-Making and
Information Flow to the Supreme Court, 29 VAND. L. REV. 45, 64-66 (1976) (arguing
that both decisions illustrate Supreme Court policy-making in that each decision rests
upon factors that extend beyond the adjudicative facts of the case). In Roe, the peti-
tioner sought an injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Texas statute that criminal-
ized abortion. Justice Blackmun's trimester system of balancing the interests of the
mother and the fetus was not suggested in briefs or oral argument. Miller & Barron,
The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Jus-
tices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187, 1218 (1975). In New York Times,
the petitioner sought only a ruling that the first amendment does not permit a conclu-
sion that libel per se has occurred when the plaintiff, a government official, has not
been named, and when there was no intent to injure him. Lamb, supra, at 66. The
Court, instead, ignored the fact that the plaintiff had not been named in an allegedly
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In United States v. Ballard,"' the Court considered an appeal of a
Ninth Circuit Court reversal, on first amendment grounds, of a district
court conviction for mail fraud. The Court reversed the court of ap-
peals on the first amendment issue and reinstated the district court con-
viction.2 9 Respondents then urged that the court of appeals' action was
justified on other grounds.220 Because the court of appeals had not
passed judgment on the grounds now alleged, and the issues had not
been fully briefed or argued before the Supreme Court, the Court re-
manded the case to the court of appeals. 221 The court of appeals then
affirmed the district court conviction. In Ballard v. United States, 2
the Supreme Court ultimately overturned the conviction, reaching a re-
sult opposite to its initial finding after having the benefit of the parties'
briefs and arguments on the additional grounds offered to support a
reversal of the conviction.
In Reid v. Covert,223 the Court reversed two decisions of the previous
term on an issue that had been urged by respondents, but that a major-
ity of the Justices previously had thought need not be decided. 2 4 Jus-
tice Frankfurter questioned the wisdom of the majority's disregard of
that issue in reaching its first decision:
[T]he judgments of this Court are . .. neither solo performances nor debates
between two sides, each of which has its mind quickly made up and then closed.
The judgments of this Court presuppose full consideration and reconsideration by
all of the reasoned views of each. Without adequate study there cannot be ade-
quate deliberation and discussion. And without these, there cannot be that full
interchange of minds which is indispensable to wise decision and its persuasive
formulation.225
defamatory advertisement, and fashioned its "actual malice" test for libel of a public
official. Id.
218. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
219. Id. at 88.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
223. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
224. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 476 (1956) (holding that once a court
determines that the plaintiff may be tried before a legislative court, it has no further
need to examine the power of Congress under art. I). Kinsella and Reid were argued
and decided concurrently. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
225. Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 485 (1956)(reservation of Frankfurter, J.).
Dissenting opinions, one means by which members of the Court try to save the Court
from error, often point out when the majority has gone beyond the arguments of the
parties, or decided issues unnecessarily. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672-86
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court addressed issues not briefed by
either party). The Commission, in Roach, did not have the benefit of its dissenter's
views, because the Commission issued its decision on March 27, 1987, approximately
one month before it received the dissent. Case 9647, lTrrER-A t. C.H.R. 147, 173,
OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (dissenting opinion of Dr. Marco Gerardo
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On rehearing, the Court reversed itself by a vote of six to two, after
further argument and consideration of the issue that previously had
been thought unnecessary to the disposition of the case.22
In Swift & Co. v. Wickham,227 the Court overruled Kesler v. Depart-
ment of Public Safety,228 a case that had been decided only three years
earlier. In Kesler, the Court addressed a jurisdictional question not
raised by the parties.22 9 The Court determined that the case was prop-
erly before it, and formulated a test to determine which cases alleging
conflicts between state and federal laws must be heard by a district
court panel of three judges.230 Chief Justice Warren dissented, predict-
ing that the test created by the majority would create more problems
for the lower federal courts, as well as for the Supreme Court, than it
would solve.23 1 This prophecy proved to be correct and the Court over-
turned Kesler at its first opportunity. 232
In Cohen v. Hurley,233 the Court stated, in dicta, that the petitioner
had no federal constitutional right not to incriminate himself.23 4 The
petitioner had not suggested a violation of any federal right, but relied
solely on his privilege against self-incrimination under the New York
state constitution.235 Three years later, in Malloy v. Hogan,"' the
Court held that the federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 37 Al-
Monroy Cabra). Additionally, the dissenting opinion, which was written in Spanish,
took two months to be translated into English. The text of the dissent was not posted to
counsel in Roach until July 24, 1987, nearly four months after the majority of the
Commission issued its decision. In any case, the dissenter's views in Roach would not
have saved the Commission from error. Also, the dissent itself goes beyond the conten-
tions of the parties by discussing the issue of whether article 4(5) of the American
Convention binds the United States directly. Case 9647, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 147, 173,
OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) (dissenting opinion of Dr. Marco Gerardo
Monroy Cabra).
226. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
227. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. I11 (1965).
228. Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
229. Id. at 175 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The Court has a duty to take indepen-
dent notice of questions of jurisdiction when they are not raised by the parties.
230. Id. at 157. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1948) (repealed 1976) formerly required a
three-judge district court panel to hear any suit seeking an injunction against enforce-
ment of a state law on grounds of unconstitutionality.
231. Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 175 (1962) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting).
232. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965). The Court noted the
uncertainty of lower courts in applying the Kesler rule and the uniform criticism of the
rule by commentators. Id. at 124.
233. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
234. Id. at 127.
235. Id. at 118 n.l.
236. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 1 (1964).
237. Id. at 11.
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though the Court did not specifically overrule Cohen's dicta, it stated
that the principle on which it rested had been "seriously eroded."2 3s 8
Cohen was later explicitly overruled, six years after it was decided, in
Spevack v. Klein.239
These cases illustrate the benefits that accrue to the decision-making
abilities of a court when full argument of all relevant issues is provided.
Had the Commission requested petitioners and the United States to
brief the issues the Commission raised sua sponte in Roach,210 it might
have been persuaded of the unsoundness of some aspects of its opinion.
The Commission might then have decided the case on the grounds sug-
gested by petitioners. Even a decision favoring the United States would
have avoided the confusion the Commission created by basing its deci-
sion on the different criminal laws in various parts of the United States.
The quality of the Commission's reasoning in Roach is unlikely to
enhance its reputation as a decision-making body, or to promote confi-
dence in its ability to adjudicate fairly and rationally cases brought
before it.241
A Court ... that presents a judgment that does not answer questions raised in
litigation or that answers questions not raised in the briefs or oral arguments, or
that presents illogical conclusions, or conclusions without presenting justifications
for these conclusions... creates too great a risk of [appearing to perform) ad
hoc, unprincipled ... intervention.2 4 2
In the Roach decision, the Commission unfortunately committed each
of these mistakes.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Inter-American Commission in Roach contains
some unfortunate legal flaws, and represents a lost opportunity to influ-
ence the direction of United States and international law on the execu-
tion of juvenile offenders. This landmark decision is important, how-
ever, because it places the United States government on notice that it is
not immune to be found in violation of international human rights law.
238. Id.
239. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967).
240. These issues were: (1) the existence of a jus cogens norm forbidding the exe-
cution of children; and (2) whether the United States had violated article II of the
American Declaration. Case 9647, paras. 54, 63, INTrER-AI. C.H.R. 147, 168, 173,
OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987).
241. The quality of the reasoning and analysis of the Commission in a previous
decision has also been criticized. See Shelton, supra note 79, at 310 (arguing that while
the Court in Case 2141 may have reached the correct result, it used questionable rea-
soning and faulty analysis).
242. H. BALL, JUDICIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP OR FIAT? 143 (1978).
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The opinion's sole value may prove to be its reaffirmation of the bind-
ing character of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man on all OAS member states. This finding ensures that the Commis-
sion has an effective tool to require the implementation of human rights
provisions by those OAS member states that have failed to ratify the
American Convention. If the Commission is to be taken seriously as a
decision-making body, however, it must avoid the flawed reasoning and
errors of law that mark the Roach decision. One way to accomplish
this goal would be for the Commission to allow itself the benefit of full
briefing on all issues it considers relevant to a dispute.
